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Recent decisions-all relying on a stylized example first provided by
the Ortho court-hold that a multi-product seller that uses a bundled
discount in a way that excludes an equally or more efficient competitor
engages in predatory bundling. According to these decisions, a bundle can
be considered ' redatory" even when the price of the bundle exceeds its
cost. This Article shows that the Ortho court's stylized example and its
monopoly leveraging theory are erroneous. This Article further
demonstrates that even when a bundle's price excludes more efficient
competitors and even when a component in the bundle is priced below cost,
and thus sold at a loss, it may still have welfare-enhancing effects. The
result is that bundles that fail the discount allocation test, and even bundles
that fail the Brooke Group test for predatory pricing, can still be desirable.
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L Introduction
Mixed bundling, also referred to as a bundled or package discount,
occurs when the seller of two or more products offers each product
separately at full price and a package thereof at a reduced price.' Bundled
discounts permeate a variety of markets. Restaurants often offer a choice
between an As la carte menu (where each item is priced individually) and a
discounted buffet-style or a "value meal;" cable companies offer
consumers a discounted package if, in addition to cable, consumers are
also willing to purchase internet and phone services; and wireless services
are often bundled with cell phones (an example which is examined more
closely below).
Despite its ubiquitous nature, however, the legal standard regarding
bundling is far from settled.2 A number of decisions, chief among them
Ortho Diagnostics Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. ,' LePage 's
1. The "discount" itself can take many forms, the most common of which are price
reductions, rebates, and coupons. A volume discount can also be considered a bundle of two
or more units of the same product. This Article, however, focuses solely on bundles
comprised of different products.
2. See, for example, the Solicitor General's amicus brief urging the denial of
certiorari in LePage 's. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, 3M Co. v.
Lepage's Inc., 542 U.S. 953 (2004) (No. 02-1865), 2004 WL 1205191 at *14 ("There is
insufficient experience with bundled discounts to this point to make a firm judgment about
the relative prevalence of exclusionary versus procompetitive bundled discounts." (emphasis
added)); see also Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 908 (9th Cir.
2008) (" [Tlihere is limited judicial experience with bundled discounts, and academic inquiry
into the competitive effects of bundled discounts is only beginning.").
3. See Ortho Diagnostics Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 469-70
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Inc. v. 3M,4 and more recently Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth,5
have determined that, in some situations, package discounts can constitute
a form of predatory pricing called "predatory bundling." Although each
of these decisions offers a different test for predatory bundling, they all
agree on one common principle: A multi-product seller that uses a
bundled discount in a way that excludes or eliminates an equally or more
efficient competitor unambiguously harms consumers and competition.6
Accordingly, these decisions (and the Antitrust Modernization Committee
Report) 7 hold that predatory behavior is not limited to situations in which
the predator prices its bundle below cost (average or marginal); but rather,
a seller's bundle can be deemed "predatory" even where the bundle is
priced above its coSt.8 This occurs, as the argument goes, when the seller
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that to show predatory bundling the plaintiff "must prove either
that (a) the monopolist has priced below its average variable cost or (b) the defendant's
pricing will exclude the plaintiff who is an equally or more efficient producer of the
competitive product").
4. See LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that "[tjhe
principal anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates as offered by 3M is that when offered by
a monopolist they may foreclose portions of the market to a potential competitor who does
not manufacture an equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a
comparable offer").
5. See Cascade, 515 F.3d at 909-10 (holding that "the primary anticompetitive
danger posed by a multi-product bundled discount is that such a discount can exclude a rival
is who is equally efficient at producing the competitive product simply because the rival
does not sell as many products as the bundled discounter").
6. See id at 896 (offering a test that "ensures that the only bundled discounts
condemned as exclusionary are those that would exclude an equally efficient producer of the
competitive product or products"); Lepage 's, 324 F.3d at 155 ("The principal
anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates..,. is that when offered by a monopolist they may
foreclose portions of the market to a potential competitor who does not manufacture an
equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a comparable offer.");
Ortho, 920 F. Supp. at 466 ("[O]nly price cutting that threatens equally or more efficient
firms is condened under Section 2."); RICHlARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 196 (2d ed. 200 1)
("Only when the monopoly power is used to discourage equally or more efficient firms and
thus perpetuate a monopoly not supported by superior efficiency should the law step in.").
7. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND REcOMMENDATIONS 99 (2007)
[hereinafter ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'NJ, available at http://govinfo.library.
unt.edu/amc/report-recommendation/amc -final-report. pdf.
8. See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2008)
(stating that a firm can "use a bundled discount to exclude an equally or more efficient
competitor .... This is true even if the post-discount prices for both the entire bundle and
each product in the bundle are above the seller's cost"); id at 907 ("[Als the [Ortho]
example above shows, a bundled discounter can exclude rivals who do not sell as great a
number of product lines without pricing its products below its cost to produce them. Thus, a
bundled discounter can achieve exclusion without sacrificing any short-run profits.");
LePage 's, 324 F.3d at 155 (holding that above-cost bundles can be anticompetitive if, when
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excludes more efficient competitors. 9
This Article argues that the standard enunciated by the line of cases
beginning with the Ortho decision is over-inclusive. Further, it challenges
the axiom underlying the predation jurisprudence that pricing below cost is
unambiguously harmful (if recoupment is possible). In a deviation from the
prior literature, this Article argues that even when the bundle's price excludes
(defined broadly also to mean blocks) a more efficient competitor, and even
when a component in the bundle is priced below cost, the bundle may
nevertheless have a welfare-enhancing effect.
It should be noted that a strand of literature recognizes that exclusionary
bundles can be welfare-enhancing, but this view is limited to bundles which
are sold above cost.'0 Nalebuff, for example, shows that in situations where
the multi-product seller profits from the sale of both products in the bundle
(the competitive and the monopolized), the monopolist can use a bundle to
take over the competitive product." This Article goes even ftuther and
proposes that even when the multi-product seller loses money from selling
the competitive product in the bundle, it can nevertheless increase its total
profits and consumers' welfare. The Article reveals that a multi-product
seller may have a legitimate business justification to price the competitive
product in the bundle below its incremental cost of production (and thereby
exclude equal or more efficient competitors) in order to discriminate between
consumers of the monopolized product. As a result, bundles that fail the
offered by a monopolist, they "foreclose portions of the market to a potential competitor who
does not manufacture an equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a
comparable offer"); Ortho, 920 F. Supp. at 467-68 (arguing that a company can price all of
its products above average variable cost and still drive equally efficient competitors out of
the market); see also ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 7, at 99 (noting that
"just as above-cost predatory pricing could occur, above-cost predatory bundled discounts
could occur" and adopting a version of the discount attribution standard). Throughout the
Article I use the term "cost" to refer to incremental cost (average or marginal) without taking
a stand as to the preferred measure of cost.
9. Infra Part Ill.
10. See, e.g., Barry J. Nalebuff, Bundling as a Way to Leverage Monopoly 13 (Yale
Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. ES-36, 2004), available at
http://ssrm.com/abstract--586648 [hereinafter Nalebuff, Bundling as a Wayl (showing that by
inflating the price of the competitive product above the market price and discounting the
monopolized product the bundler can increase its profits and enhance welfare); Patrick
Greenlee et al., An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discounts, 26 INT'L J1. INDUtS. ORG.
1132, 1132 (2008) (arguing that exclusionary above cost bundles may increase or decrease
welfare).
11. Nalebuff, Bundling as a Way, supra note 10, at 23.
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discount allocation test, and even bundles that fail the Brooke Group Ltd v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 12 test, can still be socially desirable.'13
This Article, therefore, revisits the standard for finding predatory
bundling and calls for reconsideration of the "discount allocation" test
adopted by the Cascade court. At the very least this Article calls for the
explicit adoption of a "business justification" requirement (whether as part of
the plaintiff's affirmative case or his opponent's defense) to allow
exclusionary below-cost bundles that enhance total welfare.'14
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II reviews the
current standard for predatory pricing in the single product context. It shows
that if a single-product manufacturer can exclude more efficient competitors,
it will unambiguously harm consumers and competition. The intuition is
simple; by setting prices below cost, a seller can drive its competitors out of
the market. Then, with competition vanquished, the seller may be able to
charge supra-competitive prices. As a result, some consumers who purchased
the product prior to the predation period will not be able to afford it post-
predation. Others will have to pay more to purchase the same product that
was available for less prior to the predation period. Focusing on this
exclusionary nature, the Supreme Court held in Brooke Group that selling
below cost is "predatory" if the predator can recoup its losses.'" This well-
established Exclusionary Standard is premised on the assumption that in the
single product context, excluding more efficient competitors from the market
12. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-
24 (1993) (holding that in order to prove predatory pricing under § 2 of the Sherman Act the
plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant priced its product below cost, and (2) that the
alleged predator had "a dangerous probability of recouping its investment in below-cost
pricing").
13. Proponents of the exclusionary standard reject above-cost exclusionary, yet
welfare-enhancing, bundling because of their ability to allow the multi-product bundler to
leverage its monopoly power. See, eg., Barry Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, 50
ANTITRUST BULL. 321, 340 (2005) [hereinafter Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling] ("[T~he
problem is that the [above-cost welfare-enhancing, yet exclusionary] bundle ... allows a
firm to leverage its monopoly from one market to another. A monopolist can exclude a
more efficient competitor. . . .)
14. This is indeed a true concern as at least one prominent scholar has suggested a per
se rule against exclusionary bundles (even if welfare-enhancing). See Nalebuff,
Exclusionary Bundling, supra note 13, at 343 ("When the foreclosure is significant and the
monopolist could have reasonably understood the effect of its pricing, I am in favor [of]
employing a per se rule against exclusionary bundling.").
15. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 224 (1993) ("Recoupment is the ultimate object of an
unlawful predatory pricing scheme; it is the means by which a predator profits from
predation. Without it, predatory pricing produces lower aggregate prices in the market, and
consumer welfare is enhanced.").
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harms consumers.'16 As demonstrated below, however, this assumption does
not hold in the bundling context.
Part III discusses the legal standard for finding predatory bundling. It
shows that beginning with the Ortho decision, courts, drawing an analogy
to the single product market, have equated predatory behavior with
exclusionary behavior. This equation led them to adopt the Exclusionary
Standard in the multi-product context to distinguish pro-competitive
bundles from anti-competitive ones. Interestingly, in all of these decisions,
the fact-pattern was the same. The defendant was a multi-product seller
that had a monopoly over one product, but was in competition with the
plaintiff and others on the sale of a second product.'17 It is not surprising
16. See id at 256 ("When a predator deliberately engages in below-cost pricing
targeted at a particular competitor over a sustained period of time, then price cutting raises a
credible inference that harm to competition is likely to ensue."); Ortho Diagnostics Sys., Inc.
v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The average variable cost
standard serves only one purpose-distinguishing in single product situations (a) pricing that
constitutes competition on the merits from (b) pricing that may permit a monopolist or
putative monopolist to get rid of its competitors and pave the way for an abuse of market
power.").
17. See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 890-93 (9th Cir.
2003) (stating that the defendant held monopoly power over the tertiary care services market
and competed against the plaintiff in the primary-and secondary-acute care hospital services
market); LePage's Inc v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that the plaintiff
argued that the defendant 3M had a monopoly in the transparent tape market and offered
rebates to customers who purchased other products in which 3M did not enjoy market power
in order to maintain its monopoly power); Ortho, 920 F. Supp. at 457-63 (stating that the
defendant allegedly held monopoly power in the market for certain blood screening tests and
competed against the plaintiff in the market for other blood screening tests); see also U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SIN.GLE-FiRm CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2
OF THE SHERMAN ACT 96 (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public-
reports/236681 .pdf [hereinafter DOJ, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY] (citing the Ortho
example with approval). COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, a product of a series of hearings
held by the antitrust agencies from June 2006 to May 2007, was withdrawn by the
Department of Justice on May 11, 2009. Id In a press release, Christine A. Varney, the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department's Antitrust Division, explained that
the COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY "report advocated hesitancy in the face of potential abuses
by monopoly firms." Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report
on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), bttp://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
press -releases/2009/245710.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2010) [hereinafter DOJ, Justice
Department Withdraws] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). She said that
implicit in this overly cautious approach is the notion that most unilateral conduct is driven
by efficiency and that monopoly markets are generally self-correcting. Id. "The recent
developments in the marketplace should make it clear that we can no longer rely upon the
marketplace alone to ensure that competition and consumers will be protected," Varney
added. 1d
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then that all of these decisions rely on the stylized example first provided
by the Ortho court. 18
Focusing on this stylized example, Part IV shows that absent a more
sophisticated story, a multi-product seller who enjoys a monopoly over
product A but competes with other sellers on product B, has no incentives to
monopolize the competitive market for B. Specifically, this Article
demonstrates that the Ortho example and the monopoly leveraging theory
on which it is based is erroneous and its conclusion faulty. Another maj or
flaw in the Ortho example is the assumption that all consumers of the
monopolized product have the same reservation price. This assumption did
not allow the Ortho court to consider a situation in which the monopolist
uses the bundled discount to discriminate between purchasers.
Part V employs a richer, yet simplified model that relaxes this
unrealistic assumption. The model used is related to models proposed by
Adams and Yellen,' 9 Schmalensee' 20 and Carlton and Waldman .2 1 It
demonstrates that by offering consumers a bundled discount, the
monopolist can cause consumers to reveal their reservation price, thereby
allowing it to sell to a segment of the population that otherwise would not
buy the monopolized product. The mechanism is simple. By offering a
bundled discount and allowing consumers to choose to buy the
monopolized product A, the competitive product B or the package AB, the
seller creates a mechanism that causes consumers to reveal their preferences
and sort themselves into two groups: Those who hold a high reservation
price for the monopolized product (high value consumers) and those who
do not (low value consumers). With the ability to distinguish between the
low and high value consumers, the seller can use the bundle to offer each
group a different price and even prevent arbitrage. Specifically, the seller
18. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the example provided in the
Ortho opinion).
19. See William J. Adams & Janet L. Yellen, Commodity Bundling and the Burden of
Monopoly, 90 Q.J. ECON. 475, 476 (1976) (showing "that the profitability of commodity
bundling can stem from its ability to sort customers into groups with different reservation
price characteristics ... and to extract the consumers surplus").
20. See Richard Schmalensee, Commodity Bundling by Single-Product Monopolies, 25
J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 (1982) (showing that a monopolist can use a midxed bundling strategy to
profitably discriminate between consumers).
21. See Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, Safe Harbors for Quantity Discounts
and Bundling 4-6 (Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper No. EAG 08-1, 2008), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract--1089202 (recognizing that "bundling can be efficient and can
also be a method of price discrimination" and concluding that "[tjhe AMC test ignores [the
price discrimination] rationale for bundling and accordingly non-exclusionary profit
maximizing pricing can flunk the AMC test").
237
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will offer a lower price on the monopolized product to the lower value
consumers while maintaining a higher price for the higher value consumers.
As a result, the low-value consumers will be able to purchase a product
that, absent bundling, they would not have been able to afford.
Importantly, this Article demonstrates that selling a component of the
bundle below cost, and thus at a loss, allows the seller to engage in price
discrimination which, under certain circumstances, can be welfare-
enhancing. Using variants of the Ortho example, Part V demonstrates that
even when a bundle's price excludes more efficient competitors, and even if
one of the products in the bundle is priced below cost, the bundle may still
have welfare-enhancing effects. A key insight is that a monopolist will be
willing to sacrifice profits from sales of the competitive product in the
bundle if the profits generated from sales of the monopolized product
outweigh the losses. Because it is the competitive product in the bundle
that serves as the sorting mechanism allowing the seller to discriminate
between consumers of the monopolized product, the monopolist will be
willing to sell the competitive product below cost-as long as the benefits
from extracting the consumers' surplus from the monopolized product
outweigh these losses. Thus, the losses from bundling the competitive
product can be viewed as a "premium" that the monopolist incurs in order
to price discriminate between consumers. Part V provides a number of
examples demonstrating that such below-cost bundles can be a profitable
strategy. This Article concludes that in the bundling context, selling a
product below cost can be not only profitable and sustainable, but also
welfare enhancing. Put differently, in the bundling context, exclusionary
does not necessarily mean predatory. Part VI provides concluding remarks.
HI. Predatory Pricing-The Single Product Setting
The typical case of predatory pricing occurs when a seller prices its
products below cost in order to drive its competitors out of the market.
Then, after competition has been vanquished, the predator raises its prices
to a supra-competitive level. 2 The losses and forgone profits during the
predation period are considered a form of "investment., 23 By selling its
22. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 318
(2007).
23. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588
(1986) ("Any agreement to price below the competitive level requires conspirators to forgo
profits that free competition would offer them. The forgone profits may be considered an
investment in the future.").
1238
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product below cost, the predator hopes to monopolize the market (i.e.,
exclude its competitors), recoup the losses incurred during the predation
period, and then harvest monopoly profits.
Predatory pricing, however, is speculative in nature and inherently
risky. While the loss during the predation period is certain, recoupment is
possible only if the predation results in monopoly power.2 Achieving
monopoly power, however, is a formidable task. If the predation period is
too long or the predator cannot meet the high demand generated by the
low (predatory) price, the predator will not be able to elimidnate
25competition. Moreover, even if monopoly power is achieved, realizing
monopoly profits and recouping the losses from the predation period is
unlikely. Once the predator, now the only firm in the market, charges
supra-competitive prices, other firms will be drawn back into the market
by the high prices and the revived competition will drive the price back
down to its original pre-predatory level, thereby frustrating the predator's
attempt to recoup. Thus, for predatory pricing to succeed, the predator
must not only achieve, but also maintain its monopoly power. For these
26reasons, courts have been very hesitant to find predatory pricing.
"Predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely
successful."2
.24. See id at 589 ("The success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining
monopoly power for long enough both to recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some
additional gain.").
25. See id. at 588-89 (stating that a predator must be able to recoup the losses suffered
quickly enough to avoid the entry of new competitors "eager to share in the excess profits");
id. at 590 (noting that "[ijf there are too few goods at the artificially low price to satisfy
demand, the would-be victims of the [predatory pricing] conspiracy can continue to sell at
the 'real' market price, and the conspirators suffer losses to little purpose"); Brooke Grp.
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993) (noting that "where
the market is highly diffuse and comparative, or where new entry is easy, or the defendant
lacks adequate excess capacity to absorb the market shares of his rivals and cannot quickly
create or purchase new capacity-summary disposition of the case is appropriate").
26. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (noting that "[a] predatory pricing conspiracy is
by nature speculative"); Brooke Grp,., 509 U.S. at 225-26 (noting that "essential elements of
predatory pricing are not easy to establish"); id at 226 (warning that "the costs of an
erroneous finding of liability are high"); id at 226-27 (explaining that because "[t]he
mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing-lowering prices-is the same
mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition," an erroneous finding of liability would
"chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect." (quoting Cargill, 479 U.S.
at 122 n.17)).
27. Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 323 (quoting Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 226). But see
Cargill v. Monfort of Colo., 479 U.S. 104, 121 (1986) (noting that "while firms may engage
in the [predatory pricing] practice only infrequently, there is ample evidence suggesting that
the practice does occur").
239
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Not only is successful predatory pricing a rarity, but the consequences
of an erroneous finding of predatory pricing are severe. Because "[tlhe
mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing-lowering
prices-is the same mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition,,
28
erroneous predation findings deter lower prices and harm competition. To
separate competitive price-cutting from anticompetitive predatory pricing,
courts have focused on the exclusionary nature of the behavior in question.
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that to establish a predatory pricing
claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,2 the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant priced its product below an appropriate measure of costs and
that the defendant had a dangerous probability (or, under the Robinson-
Patman Act,30 a reasonable prospect) of recouping its investment.
In the single-product case, the "below-cost" requirement ensures that
the predator's conduct is in fact exclusionary. Pricing a widget at $8, if the
cost to manufacture is $ 10, will cause a more efficient competitor, who can
manufacture the same widget for $9, to exit the market. This "Exclusionary
Standard" has become so widely accepted that today's courts differ only as
to the type of "below-cost" measure that they use (marginal or average) to
identify predatory pricing.312 As shown below, however, this standard has
been wrongly imported to the multi-product context.
28. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 226 (quoting Cargill, 479 U.S. at 122 n.17).
29. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal to "attempt to monopolize .. . any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (2006).
30. See Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2006) (declaring it unlawfuil "for any
person engaged in comnmerce .. . either directly or indirectly to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and qualiy... where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly"); see
also Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222 ("[We interpret § 2 of the Sherman Act to condemn
predatory pricing when it poses 'a dangerous probability of actual monopolization,' whereas
the Robinson-Patman Act requires only that there be a 'reasonable possibility' of substantial
injury to competition before its protections are trggered ..... )
31. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.. 509 U.S. 209, 222-
24 (1993) (stating that first, "a plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injry... must
prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival's costs,"
and second, that "the competitor had a reasonable prospect, or ... dangerous probability of
recouping its investment").
32. See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 910 (9th Cir. 2008)
("[A] plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of predatory pricing by proving that the
defendant's prices were below average variable cost."); United States. v. AMR Corp., 335
F.3d 1109, 1115-16 (10th Cir. 2003) ("For predatory pricing cases, especially those
involving allegedly predatory production increases, the ideal measure of cost would be
marginal cost. .. ); POSNER, supra note 6, at 216-20 (discussing the different below-costs
measures); Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
1240
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11I. Predatory Bundling-The Multi-Product Setting
The seller of products A and B may engage in one of three forms of
bundling strategies.33 Pure bundling occurs when two products, A and B
are sold only as one package.3 The consumer can purchase the bundle or
nothing. Airlines, for example, bundle flights with a beverage service and
some pharmaceuticals offer two medicines (which cannot be bought
separately) in one drug. Note that these two examples are different. While
in both the consumer must purchase the bundle AB (to enjoy product A or B
or both), in the drug example the consumer must consume both medicines;
whereas, in the airline example the consumer can forgo (decline
consuming) one product (the beverage). Tying is a situation in which the
consumer can purchase product A separately, but if she wishes to purchase
product B (the tied product), she must purchase the package ABR. 35 Mixed
bundling or a bundled discount-the focus of this Article-is a situation in
which the seller offers products A and B separately and a package AB at a
discounted price.3 Examples include restaurants that offer At la carte menus
as well as value meals, and wireless companies that offer a discount to
consumers who purchase cell phones and wireless services.
Producers may offer a bundled discount for a number of reasons, many
of which are legitimate. A bundled discount enables the seller to
economize on packaging, distribution and marketing costs, enjoy
economies of scope, enhance brand loyalty, and avoid double
marginalization.3 To the consumer, it offers more options (after all, in a
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARY. L. Rrv. 697, 716-18 (1975) (concluding that
'marginal-cost pricing is the economically sound division between acceptable, competitive
behavior and 'below-cost' predation" but proposing the use average variable cost as a
"useflul surrogate").
33. For purposes of simplicity in presentation, this Article discusses a seller of two
products. However, the model and conclusions below also apply to producers of n>2
products.
34. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
324 (4th ed. 2005).
35. Id. at 321-22.
36. Id. at 324.
37. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellant and
Cross Appellee PeaceHealth Supporting Reversal of the Verdict Concerning Bundled
Discounts, Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (2008) (No. 05-3627),
LEXSEE 2005 U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs 35627 at *1 [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Law
Professors] (noting that "bundled discounts are ubiquitous in our national economy and are
almost always procompetitive" and that "care should be taken in framing liability rules for
the rare instances where bundled discounts could be anticompetitive"); see also P-IHLLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HovENKAmP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
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mixed bundling scenario, the consumer can always buy products A and B
separately) and lower prices. Mixed bundling, however, can have
detrimental effects. It may be used by a multi-product seller to impede
single-product competitors from entering the market.3 Under certain
circumstances, it may even affect incentives to innovate, decreasing them
for competitors of the bundler, increasing them for the bundler itself,39 and
40cause a misallocation of resources.
Another possible detrimental effect of mixed bundling is predatory
bundling. In Ortho, the products at issue were blood assays used to screen
for viruses .41' The defendant, Abbott Laboratories, was the only company
AND THER APPLICATION at 343 (3d ed. 2008) ("Bundling serves a number of pro-competitive
or competitively benign purposes, including achievement of scale or scope economies,
quality control, and many instances of price discrimination."); Daniel A. Crane, Mixed
Bundling, Profit, Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 EMORY L.J. 423, 430-44 (2006)
[hereinafter Crane, Mixed Bundling] (reviewing some of the procompetitive and
competition-neutral explanations for bundling); Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson,
Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits and Efficiency, MGMT. Sci., Dec. 1999, at
1613 (finding that "bundling very large numbers of unrelated information goods can be
surprisingly profitable"). Because it is easier to predict consumers' valuations for the bundle
than their valuations for the separate goods, bundling "makes it possible to achieve greater
sales, greater economic efficiency, and greater profits per good from a bundle of information
goods than can be attained when the same goods are sold separately." Id.
38. See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating
Commodity Bundling by Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature, 1 J. Comp. L. &
ECON. 707, 729-35 (2005) [hereinafter Kobayashi, A Survey of the Economic Literature]
(reviewing the literature on "the strategic use of bundling in a setting where a monopolist in
Y faces limited actual or potential competition in X"); id (concluding that "in general, these
models show the circumstances in which bundling can result in the deterrence of entry that
would have occurred in the absence of bundling"); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better
Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN L. R~v. 253, 283 (2004) [hereinafter Elhauge, Defining
Better Monopolization Standards] ("Exclusionary conduct might, for example, foreclose
enough of the market" and thereby "deter entry, drive rivals out of the market, slow down
their growth, or simply leave rivals less efficient than they otherwise would have been");
Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling and Competition on the Internet, MGMT. SC.,
Jan. 2000, at 64-65, 75-77 (showing how bundling can create "economics of aggregation"
for information goods and analyzing the effects of such bundling strategies on pricing,
profitability, and competition); Barry Nalebuff, Bundling 1 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt., Working
Paper No. 99-14, 1999), available at http://ssmn.con/abstract-- 185193 ("A company that has
market power in two goods, A and B, can, by bundling them together, make it harder for a
rival with only one of these goods to enter the market.").
39. Bakos & Brynjolfsson, supra note 38, at 65.
40. See inf/ra note 79 (discussing how a bundle may also have a coercive and
detrimental effect).




that manufactured all five of the commonly used tests.4 The controversy
arose when Abbott offered a bundled discount that included tests in which
Abbott enjoyed a monopoly with tests that Abbott sold in competition with
Ortho .4 ' The additional wrinkle was that Abbott set the price of its bundle
above its Cost (CA+CB<PAB<PA+PB)."4 The issue before the court, therefore,
was "'whether a firm that enjoys a monopoly on one or more. ... products,
but which faces competition on others, can price all of its products above
average variable cost and yet still drive an equally efficient competitor out
of the market. ",'4  Based on the stylized example discussed below, the
Ortho court answered in the affirmative.4 Drawing an analogy to the
single product market, the court equated exclusionary behavior with
predatory behavior.4 This equation led the court to conclude that a bundle
is predatory if it is exclusionary.4 Specifically, the court held that to prove
predatory bundling the plaintiff must show that either (1) the defendant
priced the package below average variable cos 4 9 or (2) that regardless of
price (i.e., even if the package was priced above cost), the bundled discount
made it unprofitable for an equally efficient plaintiff-manufacturer to
produce the competitive product.50 Both situations, the court determined,
meet the Exclusionary Standard (in both situations the bundler eliminates
efficient competitors) and thus equally merit condenination.51
42. Id at 459.
43. Id. at 457.
44. Id at 469.
45. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
46. Id
47. See id. at 466-68 (noting that in the single product context pricing below cost
"tserves only one purpose"--distinguishing (a) legitimate price cutting from (b) pricing that
may enable the seller to drive equally or more efficient competitors out of the market); id
(relying on the Ortho example to conclude that "a firm that enjoys a monopoly on one or
more. ... complimentary products, but which faces competition on others, can price all of its
products above average variable cost and yet still drive an equally efficient competitor out of
the market").
48. Id at 468-69.
49. The first prong of the Ortho test compares the aggregate (average) cost of the
bundle to the bundle's price. Id. at 469-70. For example, if the average cost to produce the
bundle AB is $10, but the bundle is offered at a discounted price of $8, it should be deemed
exclusionary (PAB<CAB.). This "aggregate discount" rule was explicitly rejected by the
Cascade court. See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 914 (9th Cir.
2008) ("Under a discount aggregation rule, anticompetitive bundled discounting schemes
that harm competition may too easily escape liability.").
50. Ortho Diagnostics Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 469-70
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
51. See id at 468-69 n. 16 ("In the Court's view, the standard discussed in the text-
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The Ortho test suffers from a number of limitations.5 First, it
provides no guidance to the multi-product seller who considers offering an
above-cost bundled-discount. Under the second prong of the Ortho test, the
multi-product seller must determnine whether the bundle will make it
unprofitable for an equally efficient seller to manufacture the competitive
product. 53  Thus, the multi-product seller must know its rival's
manufacturing costs-highly confidential information that is rarely publicly
available. Second, and related, the Ortho test encourages wasteful
litigation. It requires multiple suits to determine the legality of one bundled
discount. To illustrate, assume that a monopolist of product A competes
with three sellers on the production of product B. Assume further that the
monopolist can manufacture product B at a Cost Of CMB=$ 10 per unit, and
that the three competing sellers can manufacture the same at a cost of
C1=$ 12, C2=$Il and C3=$9. Unaware of each other's cost, a competitor
may sue the monopolist if the latter offers the bundle AB at a discounted
price (PAB<PA+PB). Seller I's suit will be dismissed because it is not as
efficient as the monopolist in the production of product B (CMB<Cl). A
similar suit filed by Seller 2 will be dismissed for the same reason. Only
Seller 3 would be able to challenge the bundle successfully (CMB>CI).
A different version of the Exclusionary Standard was adopted by the
Third Circuit in LePage 's Inc. v. 3M.54 At issue in LePage 's was a bundled
discount that 3M offered consumers which included a product in which 3M
enjoyed a monopoly position, as well as other products that LePage's did
not manufacture.5 LePage's could not offer the same discount simply
pricing that could drive a more efficient competitor from the marketplace-is that which
separates legitimate from illegitimate competition.").
52. See Cascade, 515 F.3d at 915-16 (discussing these limitations); see also U.S. FED.
TRADE COMM'N AND U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., SHERMAN ACT SECTION 2 JOINT HEARING
UNDERSTANDING SINGLE-FIRM BEHAVIOR: LOYALTY DISCOUNTS SESSION 27-37 (Nov. 29,
2006), available at http://www~ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/docs/transcripts/transcript-1 1-
29-06.pdf (reporting Professor Lambert's testimony that the Ortho exclusionary standard is
"a great rule in theory but .. . a very difficult rule to administer" and one that may be
"underdeterrent, because plaintiffs are going to have a hard time winning these cases" and
offering a per se rule instead).
53. Supra note 50 and accompanying text.
54. See LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that "[tihe
principal anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates as offered by 3M is that when offered by
a monopolist they may foreclose portions of the market to a potential competitor who does
not manufacture an equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a
comparable offer").
55. Both the plaintiff, LePage's, and the defendant, 3M, competed in the market for
transparent tape which included both branded and private label tape (i.e., tape sold under the
retailer's name). Id. at 144. LePage's quickly became a major seller of private label tape
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because it was not a multi-product manufacturer.5 In fact, LePage's was
not even as efficient as 3M in the provision of the competitive product .57
LePage's brought a suit arguing that 3M's use of the bundled discount
excluded it from the one market in which both competed.5" 3M did not
deny that it bundled its monopolized product with other products or that the
bundle had an exclusionary effect .59 Rather, 3M argued that the bundle was
legal because it was never priced below-cost.6 0 In affirming the jury
verdict, the Third Circuit held that "a monopolist will be found to violate
Section 2 of the Sherman Act if it engaged in exclusionary conduct"
without "a valid business justification. 61  It concluded that 3M's bundle-
was anticompetitive because a "monopolist [like 3M] may foreclose
portions of the market to a potential competitor who does not manufacture
an equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a
comparable offer.",62  3M's gravamen, according to the court, was the
but it remained a small seller in the entire market of transparent tape, over which 3M, the
manufacturer of Scotch tape, enjoyed historically significant market power. Id. Unlike
LePage's, however, in addition to transparent tape, 3M offered other product lines. These
product lines (in which 3M did not possess market power) included healthcare products;
home care products; home improvement products; stationery products including transparent
tape; retail auto products; and leisure time products. Id. at 247. 3M's bundle offered
progressively higher discounts (in the form of rebates) when customers increased purchases
across 3M's different product lines-discounts LePage's could not offer because it did not
sell the same diverse product line as 3M. For a detailed review of the facts in LePage 's, see
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 3M's Bundled Rebates: An Economic Perspective, 72 U. CMI. L. REV.
243, 243-52 (2005); Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, supra note 13, at 3 58-64.
56. LePage's, 324 F.3d at 145, 154-57.
57. LePage's economist testified that LePage's was not as efficient a tape producer as
3M. See id. at 175 (Greenburg, J., dissenting) (noting that LePage's argued "that it does not
have to show that 3M's package discounts could prevent an equally efficient firm from
matching or beating 3M's package discounts").
58. Id. at 144-45 (majority opinion).
59. See id at 147 ("LePage's argued that 3M willfully maintained its monopoly in the
transparent tape market through exclusionary conduct, primarily by bundling .... 3M does
not argue that it did not engage in this conduct.").
60. See id ("3M argues that its conduct was legal as a matter of law because it never
priced its transparent tape below its cost."); id. ("When asked whether its theory is that
because no one contended that 3M sold below its cost, that is 'the end of the story,' its
counsel responded, 'with the exception of the inconsequential express contract,
absolutely."'); id at 155 (noting that 3M's central premise was that "it is not unlawful to
lower one's prices so long as they remain above cost").
61. Id at 152; see also id. at 164 ("[A] business justification is valid if it relates
directly or indirectly to the enhancement of consumer welfare.").
62. Id at 155.
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linking of a product in which the seller had a monopoly with products on
which it faced competition.6
The LePage 's standard was widely criticized by the Antitrust
Modernization Commission (AMC)--a bipartisan committee created by
Congress to examine the need to revise antitrust 1aws.64 As the AMC noted,
the main problem with the LePage 's test is that it does not investigate
whether a bundled discount is pro-competitive. Instead it simply declares
that all bundled discounts offered by a monopolist are anticompetitive with
respect to competitors who do not manufacture an equally diverse line of
products.66 Moreover, under LePage 's per-se like test, the jury may
conclude from the market structure alone that a bundle is "anti-competitive"
even if the plaintiff was not as efficient as the defendant-bundler. Put
differently, the LePage 's test may in fact protect a less efficient competitor
(as LePage's admitted to be).6
The legality of a bundled discount was discussed more recently by the
Ninth Circuit. In Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth,8 the defendant
and plaintiff were the only providers of hospital care in Lane County,
Oregon .69 Defendant held a monopoly over the provision of tertiary health
care services, but competed with the plaintiff in primary and secondary
acute care hospital services .7 At issue was defendant's bundled discount
63. Id. at 156.
64. The AMC was created by the Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002.
See Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §§ 11051-60,
116 Stat. 1758, 1856-59 (2002) (authorizing the creation of the AMC).
65. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 7, at 97.
66. Id.
67. Supra note 55 and accompanying text. The AMC proposed the following three-
part test to determine whether a bundled discount is in violation of the antitrust laws:
To prove a violation of Section 2, a plaintiff should be required to show each
one of the following element ... : (i) after allocating all discounts and rebates
attributable to the entire bundle of products to the competitive product, the
defendant sold the competitive product below its incremental cost for the
competitive product; (2) the defendant is likely to recoup these short-term
losses; and (3) the bundled discount or rebate program has had or is likely to
have an adverse effect on competition.
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 7, at 99.
68. See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 903 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that 'the exclusionary conduct element of a claim arising under § 2 of the Sherman
Act cannot be satisfied by reference to bundled discounts unless the discounts result in prices
that are below an appropriate measure of the defendant's costs").
69. Id. at89 1.
7 0. Id
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that offered insurers that made the defendant their sole preferred provider
for all services-primary, secondary, and tertiary-a package the plaintiff
could not compete with."' The district court based its jury instruction on
the Third Circuit's en banc decision in LePage 'S. The instructions did not
require the jury to consider whether the defendant priced the bundle below-
cost. Instead, the district court instructed the jury that a bundled discount is
anti-competitive if, when offered by a monopolist, it forecloses the market
to a competitor who does not provide the same diverse product line (and
thus cannot make a comparable offer)."3 The Ninth Circuit agreed with
LePage 's basic assertion that "the primary anticompetitive danger posed by
a multi-product bundled discount is that. ... [it] can exclude a rival who is
equally efficient."7 4  Yet, it declined to adopt LePage 's test. Market
structure analysis, the court noted, cannot provide guidance as to whether a
bundle reduces or increases consumer welfare-a primary goal of antitrust
law in the eyes of the court .7 1 It thus adopted a below-cost measure. A
bundled discount, the court held, cannot be deemed "exclusionary" unless
the bundle is priced below an appropriate measure of the defendant's cost.
76
Under Cascade's so called "discount attribution" test (and the AMC test),
the court attributes the bundle's discount to the competitive product .77 If
the effective price of the competitive product is below the bundler's cost to
produce it, the bundle is considered exclusionary. The court explained that
"this requirement ensures that the only bundled discounts condemned as
exclusionary are those that would exclude an equally efficient producer of
the competitive product or products."7"
Part IV explains how this test is applied. It also proves that in
adopting the "discount attribution" standard, the Cascade court relied on a
stylized example and a monopoly-leveraging theory that Part IV proves to
be wrong. Part V.B shows that the Cascade-AMC test is also over-
inclusive, thus creating a substantial risk of false positives (mistakenly
condemning pro-competitive conducts). If applied strictly, it will subject
welfare-enhancing bundling schemes to unnecessary and costly scrutiny.
71. Idat 892.
72. Id at 897.
73. Id. at 909.
74. Id.
75. Id at 899, 913-14.
76. Id at 903.
77. Id at 906.
78. Id at 909.
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Moreover, this Article questions the very premise on which Cascade,
LePage 's and Ortho rely. It argues that, in the bundling context, excluding
a more efficient competitor can be welfare-enhancing and thus may not
merit condemnation.
IV. The Ortho-AMC-Cascade Fallacy
A. The Ortho-Cascade Example
As noted above, recent decisions have held that bundling can be
considered predatory even if the seller has sold its products above cost
(marginal or average). Specifically, these decisions argue that a firm which
enjoys a monopoly over one product, but also manufactures and competes
in the market of another product, may be able to drive more efficient
competitors from the market by offering bundled discounts. To show how
an above-cost bundle can exclude equally or more efficient competitors, the
Ortho and Cascade courts provided the following numerical example.7 9
Assume that a seller enjoys a monopoly over the production of conditioners
but competes with other sellers in the shampoo market. The monopolist's
cost to manufacture shampoo and conditioner is $1.50 and $2.50
respectively. Competitors are more efficient than the monopolist in the
production of shampoo. They can manufacture the same unit of shampoo at
a cost of $1.25. The market price for shampoos and conditioners is $3 and
79. See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 888, 896-97 (9th Cir.
2008) (citing the Ortho example to prove that a multi-product monopolist, regardless of
whether it engages in below cost pricing, can use bundled discounts to exclude equally
efficient competitors who do not offer as great a number of product lines); Ortho Diagnostic
Sys. v. Abbott Labs., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (providing the example cited in
the following cases); see also Virgin Atd. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d
256, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Ortho to suggest that Section 2 recognizes a claim against
predatory bundling if it excludes an equally or more efficient competitor); Meijer, Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 544 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing the Ortho example to
show that "a bundled discounter can exclude rivals who do not sell as great a number of
product lines without pricing its products below its cost to produce them"); Ramallo Bros.
Printing v. El Dia, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 118, 138 (D.P.R. 2005) (citing Ortho to support its
holding that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's bundled discount makes it impossible
for the plaintiff to compete); DOJ, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, supra note 17, at 96 (citing
the Ortho example with approval); Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors, supra note 37, at
9-10 (noting that the much-cited and discussed example from Ortho illustrates how a
bundled discount could be used to exclude an equally efficient competitor); Thomas
Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MNN. L. REv. 1688, 1696 (2005) (discussing
the Ortho example with approval).
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$5 respectively, and each consumer is assumed to need both products.80 In
addition, the monopolist offers a bundled discount to consumers who
purchase both a shampoo and a conditioner. Assume further that
consumers who purchase both products from the monopolist will pay only
$5.25 ($2.25 for a shampoo instead of $3 and $3 for the conditioner instead
of $5). Put differently, the bundle represents a discount of $2.75 (8-5.25).
The Monopolist's and competitors' incremental costs and the market prices
are summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Summary of the Conditioner and Shampoo Market Data
Monopolist's Competitor's Market Price





The Bundle $4.00 _______ $5.25
The bundle's price of $5.25 is above the monopolist's total cost of $4
(2.5+1.5) and it yields a profit of $1.25 (5.25-4). According to the Ortho
analysis, the above-cost bundle will drive the more efficient competitors out
of the shampoo market .81 The argument is that when offered the choice
between (a) buying a conditioner and a shampoo separately for $8 (5+3), or
(b) purchasing the same in a bundle for $5.25, a consumer will of course
prefer the bundle. The result is that competitors that can manufacture the
shampoo at a lower cost ($1.25 compared to the monopolist cost of $1.50)
will be excluded from the market. To compete in the shampoo market, a
competitor must sell its shampoo at a price of $0.25, in which case the
consumer would be indifferent between (a) purchasing a shampoo for $0.25
and a conditioner for $5, and (b) purchasing the bundle for $5.25. The
competitors, however, cannot offer the shampoo for $0.25 because such a
price is below their cost ($1.25). The result is that the monopolist is able to
exclude more efficient competitors.
The bundle will also be declared illegal under the Cascade and AMC
tests.8 Under the "discount attribution" test, "the full amount of the
discounts given by the defendant on the bundle are allocated to the
80. Ortho, 920 F. Supp. at 467.
8 1. Id
82. See Cascade, 515 F.3d at 906 ("This standard makes the defendant's bundled
discounts legal unless the discounts have the potential to exclude a hypothetical equally
efficient producer of the competitive product.").
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competitive product or products." 83  "If the resulting price of the
competitive product or products is below the defendant's incremental cost
to produce them, the trier of fact may find that the bundled discount is
exclusionary for the purpose of § 2. ,,84 Applying the Cascade test to the
example, the court will subtract the entire discount on the package, $2.75
(8-5.25), from the separate per unit price of the competitive product,
shampoo, $3. The resulting effective price of shampoo is thus $0.25 (3-
2.75), which is below the monopolist's incremental cost of producing
shampoo ($1.50). Because the monopolist's effective price of the shampoo
($0.25) is below cost ($1.50), the bundle is considered to be exclusionary (it
excludes those who can manufacture shampoo at $1.25) and, hence,
predatory.
B. The Exclusionary Standard Re-Examined
The Cascade-Ortho (and AMC) argument is unpersuasive to say the
least. In fact, you may note that the monopolist is actually losing money if
it chooses to bundle. The monopolist can enjoy a markup of $4-$2.50 (5-
2.50) for the conditioner and $1.50 (3-1.50) for the shampoo-if it sells
both products separately, but it can only profit $1.25 (5.25-4) from selling
the bundle. Of course, if the monopolist competes with others in the market
for shampoos, the consumer may purchase the shampoo from other
competitors. But even in such a case, even if the monopolist sells only the
monopolized product (the conditioner), it will enjoy a profit of $2.50 (5-
2.50), which is still well-above its profit from selling the bundle ($1.25).
Thus the Cascade court's claim that "a bundled discounter can achieve
exclusion without sacrificing short-run profits" is erroneous." The court 's
own example proves this statement false. A bundle will yield a profit of
only $1.25, whereas the unbundled products will yield a profit of at least
$2.50 (if it sells only the conditioner), and at most $4 (if it sells the
conditioner and the shampoo). Thus, the bundled discount results in both
short-term and long-term profit losses.
Both the Cascade and Ortho courts fail to explain why a rational
monopolist, whose sole concern is rent-seeking and wealth maximization,
would choose to bundle when bundling is clearly a losing strategy. One
explanation is that such a behavior is reasonable when there are high
8 3. Id
84. Id (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 897 (emphasis added).
1250
PREDA TORY BUNDLING 15
barriers to entry. After all, if entry into the market is difficult, the
monopolist can increase prices once its competitors are excluded from the
market and extract more (or, under certain conditions, the entire) consumer
surplus without fearing that the high prices would attract new entrants. An
alternative explanation is that even if the shampoo market has low barriers
to entry (in which case an increase in the price of shampoo would attract
competitors), bundling can still be a successfuil exclusionary strategy if the
monopolist offers the bundle each time it faces competition. In the latter
case, potential competitors-aware of the monopolist's repeating
behavior-would be deterred from entering the market of shampoo ex-ante,
thus allowing the monopolist to extend its monopoly power.
Yet one important puzzle still remains. If consumers must use
shampoo and conditioners in conjunction, then the monopolist can extract
the entire consumer surplus by simply setting the right price for the
monopolized product: The conditioner. For example, if the consumer is
willing to pay (WTP) a total of $12 for a shampoo and a conditioner, the
monopolist can simply offer its conditioner for $10.75 and enjoy a profit of
$8.25 (10.75-2.5). The consumer would then be able to purchase shampoo
at a price of $1.25 from the efficient sellers. If, on the other hand, the
monopolist is able to take over the shampoo and conditioner markets, the
monopolist would charge the consumer $12, incur a cost of $4, and enjoy a
profit of only $8. Put differently, the monopolist has no interest in
monopolizing the shampoo market even if monopolization is feasible. To
show the weakness of the Cascade-Ortho example, even if forced or
offered a chance to "legally" monopolize the shampoo market, a rational
monopolist would refuse and in fact challenge such a decision.
It should be noted that the argument advanced in this section is not that
"monopoly leveraging" is infeasible-it is feasible.8 Rather, the argument
86. In fact, the example in Part V.13.1 can be viewed as a form of monopoly
leveraging. See infra Part V.B3. 1 (showing that an exclusionary below-cost bundle can allow
a multi-product seller to increase its profits and enhance total welfare). Leveraging theories,
it should be noted, have been subject to much debate. Celebrated proponents of the one
monopoly profit theory include Aaron Director and Edward H. Levi. See Aaron Director &
Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 281, 281-82,
2 89-90 (1957) (criticizing the automatic application of antitrust laws to situations which
may not require legal intervention and noting that "[t]he economic teaching gives little
support to the idea that the abuses create or extend monopoly"); see also ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARAnox 373-81 (1978) (positing that under the one monopoly theory, the
monopolist cannot leverage its advantage into another market). Recent scholarship has
challenged the single monopoly profit as being premised on simplistic assumptions which
the Ortho example seems to satisfy. Supra note 82. For a discussion of possible viable
anticompetitive effects of bundling and situations that may give rise to "Post Chicago School
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made here is that the Cascade-Ortho example fails to prove the one
point it purports to demonstrate: That above cost bundling is
exclusionary and anticompetitive. Indeed, without a more sophisticated
story (absent in the Ortho-Cascade example) there is only one monopoly
profit to realize and the monopolist does not need, nor can it use, a
bundle to realize more than that profit.
817
The Ortho, LePage 's and Cascade decisions fail to offer a
reasonable explanation for a monopolist's decision to use a bundle in
order to extend its monopoly power to other markets. The example they
rely upon proves their own arguments wrong: Even if bundled discounts
can be used to exclude a more efficient competitor, it still remains
unclear why a rational monopolist would do so. Moreover, as will be
shown below, the legal standards enunciated by these decisions may find
a behavior predatory, and thus illegal, even when such behavior is
clearly pro-competitive. The examples provided in Part V.B3
of Thought" leveraging theories, see Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts and the Death
of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARv. L. R~v. 397, 403-04 (2009) [hereinafter
Elhauge, Tying] (showing that the single monopoly profit theory is valid only when certain
assumptions hold); see also Brief for Professor Nalebuff et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 26-28, Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 545 U.S. 1127 (2005) (No.
04-1329), 2005 WL 2427646, at *2-.4, *10-19 (criticizing the "Chicago School" of
economic theory and arguing that "use of a tied sales contract can help protect the existing
monopolist from entry or can help the monopolist gain a second monopoly in the tied sales
good"); Nalebuff, Bundling as a Way, supra note 10, at 2, 18 (showing how bundling can
enable leveraging, but noting that under certain conditions "leverage does not lead to higher
profits"); Barry J. Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119 Q. J. EcoN. 159, 159 (2004)
(showing that a multi-product seller that enjoys market power in two goods can bundle them
together to make it harder for single-product manufacturers to enter the market without
reducing the products' prices); David Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and
Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J. ON
REG. 37, 39-40 (2005) (noting that "[tihe Chicago School claimed to debunk the leverage
hypothesis with 'the single-monopoly-profit theorem"' but acknowledging that the post-
Chicago authors identified situations in which the theorem does not hold); Elhauge, Defining
Better Monopolization Standards, supra note 38, at 320 (discussing situations in which
bundling can have exclusionary effects); Eric Rasmusen, Mark Ramseyer & John S. Wiley,
Naked Exclusion, 81 AMVER. EcoN. REv. 1137, 1144 (199 1) (concluding that under certain
circumstances "exclusionary agreements can enable an incumbent monopolist to exclude its
rivals cheaply"); Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85
COLum. L. REV. 515, 515 (1985) (discussing the monopoly leverage debate and arguing that
monopoly extension is possible).
87. In fact, the Cascade-Ortho example seems to meet the conditions of single
monopoly profits discussed by Elbauge. Elliauge, Tying, supra note 86, at 404; Nalebuff,
Bundling as a Way, supra note 10, at 10-12, 18. Note also that although the monopolist can
merge, or cause a more efficient seller to "merge" with it, such a merger will not help the
monopolist when more efficient sellers can still enter the market.
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demonstrate that a behavior that increases output and enhances total
welfare may be declared illegal.
V Predatory Bundling Can Enhance Welfare
A. A Bundled Discount and Price Discrimination
If a seller loses money by bundling a product over which it enjoys a
monopoly with a product in which it faces competition (as the Cascade-
Ortho fallacy demonstrates), why would a monopolist ever bundle? This
section seeks to answer this question. It shows that the monopolist can use
a bundle to discriminate between high-value and low-value consumers of
the monopolized product.8
The monopolist can extract the entire consumer surplus if it sets the
price of its product at the level of the consumers' reservation price. The
following example is illustrative. Assume that the marginal cost to
manufacture product A is $1 and that there are two consumers. Consumer 1
is willing to pay $4 for the widget, whereas Consumer 2 is only willing to
pay $2. If the monopolist knows each consumer's reservation price (and
arbitrage is impossible) it would charge the high value consumer $4 and the
low value consumer $2, realizing a profit of $4 (6-2). Such "perfect" (often
referred to as "first degree") price discrimination, however, is often
infeasible. The monopolist cannot price discriminate between different
consumers simply because it cannot distinguish between the different types
of consumers. The seller often knows that there are two types of consumers
(the high value and the low value), but is unable to identify' the reservation
price of each. A computer manufacturer, for example, knows that a
business consumer is willing to pay more than a home-user, but it may not
be able to tell whether a specific consumer is a home- or business-user. In
the example above, the monopolist does not know whether a specific buyer
resembles Consumer 1 or Consumer 2. The monopolist has thus two
options: It can either (1) set a price of $2 in which case it would sell two
units (one to each consumer) and make a profit of $2 (2+2-1-1); or (2) it
can set a price of $4 in which case it would sell only one unit to Consumer
88. Of course there are other reasons to bundle, some of which may result in
anticompetitive effects. See, e.g., supra notes 11, 13, 79 and accompanying text (discussing
some of the detrimental consequences that can result from bundling). Moreover, it is
important to note that price discrimination can be welfare enhancing, reducing or neutral.
Infra note 97 and accompanying text.
253
15467 WASH &LEE L. REV 1231 (2010)
1 and make a profit of $3 (4-i). Faced with these options, the monopolist's
decision is quite easy. To maximize its profit the monopolist would only
sell one unit to Consumer 1 at a price of $4.
Excluding Consumer 2 from the market for product A represents a loss
to society, often referred to as a deadweight loss (DWL). Consumer 2, who
is willing to purchase product A, if offered at the $1 marginal cost of
production, will not be willing to purchase it at the monopoly price of $4.
To the monopolist, the DWL in Figure 1 (below) represents a loss of
opportunity. It is a forgone surplus that the monopoly cannot harvest
simply because it cannot distinguish between Consumer 1 and Consumer 2.
Figure 1: The Monopolist's Dilemma Where Price Discrimination is
Impossible
P




Of course if the monopolist enjoys a monopoly in two products, the
DWL can be even greater because some consumers may be excluded from
both markets. The multi-product monopolist, however, enjoys (at least) one
advantage over the single-product monopolist: It can recapture some or all
of the DWL by using a bundle. Assume that a seller enjoys a monopoly in
products A and B and that the marginal cost of production and the
consumers' reservation price are as described in Table 2:
Table 2: Consumers' Reservation Price for Products A and B and the
Bundle AB
Marginal Cost Consumer 1 Consumer 2
Product A $ 1 $4 $2
Product B $2 $3 I $5
Bundle AB $3 $7 $7
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If the multi-product monopolist offers each product separately, it will
sell product A for $4 and product B for $5.'9 Under this pricing scheme,
Consumer 1 will purchase one unit of product A, Consumer 2 will purchase
one unit of product B, and the monopolist will make a profit of $6 (4-1 +
5-2). Compared to full competition, monopoly pricing creates a DWL of $2
(2-1 + 3-2). In full competition, sellers will offer their product at the
marginal cost of production and make no profits. Consumer 1 would enjoy
a surplus of $3 (4-1) from purchasing product A, and a surplus of $1 (3-2)
from purchasing product B. Consumer 2 would enjoy a surplus of $1 (2-1)
from purchasing product A, and a surplus of $3 (5-2) from purchasing
product B. A competitive market would have therefore yielded a total
surplus of $8, $2 more than monopoly pricing.
Instead of selling products A and B separately, the multi-product
monopolist could increase its profits if it offered consumers the bundle AB
at a discounted price of $7 (representing a $2 (4+5-7) discount). Both
Consumer 1 and Consumer 2 would purchase the bundle because their
reservation price would be equal to the cost of the bundle, allowing the
seller to realize a profit of $8 (14-6). The interesting result is that pure
bundling (offering product AB together) can enable the monopolist to
harvest the $2 DWL that individual monopoly-pricing created. In fact, in
our example, pure bundling yields the same output level and total welfare
that a competitive market would yield. In both situations, four units would
be produced (two units of product A and two units of product B) and total
surplus would be the same, $8. Pure bundling in this example, therefore, is
a desirable strategy. It is a market mechanism that, in some situations, can
remedy the very "unavoidable" ills of monopoly pricing.
Table 3: Comparison of Monopoly Pricing to Pure Bundling and
Competition
Output A Output B Cl1 - Sls Ms' ProfitToa
_________Suplu Surplus__ ____ ____ ____ Welfare
Competition 2 2 4 4 0 8
Monopoly 1 1 0 0 6 6
Pure 2 2 0088
1Bundling 2 2 0 0 8I
89. If the monopolist sells product A for $2, it will sell two units and make a profit of
$2 (2+2-1-1). However, if the monopolist sets the price for product A at $4, it will sell only
one unit but will profit $3 (4-1). Similarly, if the monopolist sets the price for product B at
$3, it will sell two units but only make a profit of $2 (3+3-2-2), compared to a profit of $3 if
it charges $5 (5-2).
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Selling the bundle AB is more profitable than selling each product
separately ($8 as opposed to $6) because the bundle enables the seller to
discriminate between consumers. Each consumer pays a different price for
the products in the bundle. Consumer 1 is paying $4 for product A and $3
for product B, while Consumer 2 pays $2 for product A and $5 for product
B. It is only the aggregate price of the bundle ($7) which is the same.
Thus, although the monopolist charges each consumer the same price for
the same bundle, each consumer is paying a different price for its
components.
The bundle AB increases the monopolist's profits. By price-
discriminating between the two consumers, the seller is able to harvest the
DWL that would have occurred absent price discrimination. From the
economist's standpoint, the bundle is "efficient" because it enhances total
welfare and increases output (from two units to four units).90
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) (below) build on the Adams and Yellen model
and provide a graphical representation of these pricing schemes and their
implications.9' On the axes are the reservation prices of the consumers.
For example, points ClI and C2 represent Consumer I and 2 respectively. If
the monopolist charges $4 for product A and $5 for product B, consumers
could be divided into 4 groups. Consumers located in quadrant I in Figure
2(a) would purchase only product A because they value product A more
than $4, but they value product B less than $5. Consumers in quadrant IV
would purchase only product B. Consumers in quadrant III would not
90. However, whether the goal of antitrust laws is to increase total welfare or focus
solely (or mainly) on consumer welfare is subject to debate. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOx: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 72-74 (1978) (arguing that the
appropriate goal of antitrust law is the maximization of total welfare); Gabriel Feldman, The
Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 Am. U. L.
Rrv. 561, 574 n.66 (2009) ("The only real consensus is that there is no consensus regarding
the definition of competition and the goals of antitrust law."); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 28-30 (1982)
(discussing the various alternative policy goals for antitrust law and concluding that total
welfare is the appropriate goal). But see Thomas 0. Bennett, Substantial Lessening of
Competition-The Section 7 Standard, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. Rnv. 293, 295-96 (2005)
(noting that "one critical development during the last thirty years of antitrust enforcement
has been the consensus that antitrust should focus on consumer welfare"); Robert H. Lande,
Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 50 HASTINGS LIJ. 871, 876 (1999) (arguing that "antitrust laws
embody a strong preference for consumers over finns with market power").
91. See Adams & Yellen, supra note 19, at 477 (extending George J. Stigler, United
States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 SUP. CT. Ray. 152 (1963)). See
generally Kobayashi, A Survey of the Economic Literature, supra note 38 (surveying
economic literature on commodity bundling).
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purchase any of the products (their reservation price is lower than the
monopoly prices charged for A and B); and consumers in quadrant 11
would purchase both products.
Compared to full competition, monopoly pricing creates a DWL:
Consumers in quadrant 111, those who value products A and B more than
the marginal cost to manufacture these products, will not purchase either
Product A or Product B at supra-competitive prices (denoted by the area in
dark gray). In addition, consumers in quadrants I and IV who value
products B and A (respectively) more than their cost would have to reduce
their consumption (denoted by the area in light gray). If the monopolist
offers the bundle AB, however, consumers located on the right of the line
BD would be able to purchase the bundle.9 This means that consumers
located in the area CHI, those who would not purchase Product A or
Product B at monopoly prices (they are located in area 111), as well as
those consumers who would purchase only one product (e.g., consumers
located in the area GBCHK in quadrant I and those located in area JHIDF
in quadrant IV) would be able to purchase both if the monopolist offered
the bundle AB.








92. In some circumstances, mixed bundling can be even more profitable to the multi-
product seller than pure bundling. Because this Article focuses on mixed bundling in the
competitive setting, the discussion on mixed bundling is deferred until infra Part V.B.
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The bundle in our example therefore has a welfare-enhancing effect.
It enables the monopolist to capture more of the consumers' surplus and
thus reduce some of the DWL created by monopoly pricing.~
B. The Exclusionary Effect of Bundled Discounts
In the previous section, the multi-product seller enjoyed a monopoly in
both products. The monopolist used a pure bundling strategy, offering
consumers products A and B in a package only. Consumers who wanted to
purchase only one of the products had to purchase both. Focusing on this
form of bundling as a mechanism to price discriminate, the prior literature
has argued that bundling is very similar to tying.94 The model set forth
93. Note that the bundle may also have a coercive and detrimental effect. Assume for
example that Consumer 3 is willing to pay $6 for product A and $1 for product B. If the
seller decides to sell each product separately, it will sell two units of product A at $4 and one
unit of product B at $5, allowing it to realize a profit of $9. If instead it offers only the
bundle AB at the discounted price of $7, it will sell three bundles and realize a profit of $12
(703-30). The increase in output (from three units of A and one unit of product B to three
units of A and three units of B), however, is inefficient for two reasons. First, it coerced
Consumer 3 who was not interested in purchasing product B-not even at the marginal cost
of production-to purchase it as part of the bundle. In this aspect, the bundle is similar to
the coercive effect of tying. Second, and related, because Consumer 3 values product B less
than the cost to produce that unit, the bundle leads to an inefficient allocation of resources.
Although this Article recognizes that bundling can lead to inefficiencies, it focuses on the
benefits that bundling can confer to producers and society at large. Graphically, bundles
offered to consumers on the dotted part of the line AE represent inefficient bundles.
94. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 235 ("Bundling is analytically similar to tying.");
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below, however, focuses on mixed bundling and is fundamentally different.
Unlike pure bundling, a mixed bundling strategy does not aggregate
consumer values across products. Instead, consumers must choose whether
to purchase product A, product B, or both at a discount. It is this consumer
choice, absent in tying and pure bundling practices, that enables the seller to
sort consumers and discriminate between high value and low value
consumers of a specific product in the bundle. As the examples below
demonstrate, a multi-product seller may have a legitimate business
justification for offering an exclusionary bundle or pricing a product in the
bundle below-cost, if that product enables the seller to discriminate between
consumers and extract additional surplus.
To show this, this section extends the analysis to a setting in which the
multi-product seller enjoys a monopoly only in one product, A, but
competes with others for the second product, B. It shows that the multi-
product seller will often have a legitimate business reason to manufacture
the competitive product, A, (or purchase it from other manufacturers) and
bundle it together with the monopolized product, B, even when such
behavior has an exclusionary effect, and even when the bundle is below a
measure of cost.
This Article is related to models proposed by Nalebuff and Greenlee in
that it analyzes a multi-product seller that enjoys a monopoly in one market
and competes in another on the sale of the second product. 95 Also, like
Nalebuff and Greenlee, it shows that exclusionary bundles can be
desirable.9 The model, however, differs from the prior literature in a
number of important aspects. First, Nalebuff s and Greenlee's models are
premised on the assumption that neither product can be priced below-cost.97
Crane, Mixed Bundling, supra note 37, at 427 ("Bundled discounting is similar in many
ways to the 'tying' of two separate products.").
95. See generally Nalebuff, Bundling as a Way, supra note 10; Greenlee et al., supra
note 10.
96. Id.
97. See Nalebuff, Bundling as a Way, supra note 10, at 13 (laying out Nalebuff s first
assumption that "[tlhe result relies only on the assumption that the monopolist would like to
charge more than c for the competitive good"); Greenlee et al., supra note 10, at 1135-36
(discussing a model in which a multi-product seller offers the competitive product in the
bundle above its marginal cost); see also Kobayashi, A Survey of the Economic Literature,
supra note 38, at 730 (noting that Nalebuff's and Greenlee's articles "show that a bundling
discount can lead to foreclosure of [the single product competitors]" and that "the exclusion
does not require the monopolist to price below cost or to sacrifice profits in order to carry
out the exclusion"). For this reason, the model in this paper is also different than that of R.
Preston McAfee, John McMillan & Michael D. Whinston. See R. Preston McAfee, John
McMillan & Michael D. Whinston, Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and
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Nalebuff shows that a bundler can increase its profits by pricing the
monopolized product above-cost but below monopoly price, while at the
same time increasing the price of the competitive product."8 The model
advanced in this Article relaxes Nalebuff's assumption. It shows that the
seller can increase its profits (from the sale of the monopolized product)
and consumers' welfare by pricing the competitive product below-cost.
Second, in Professor NalebutP s model "the source of the gain is
neither extraction of consumer surplus nor price discrimination. "99 Indeed
Correlation of Values, 104 Q.J. EcON. 371, 373-74 (1989) (investigating "the conditions
under which bundling is an optimal strategy in the Adams and Yellen model"). In
discussing McAfee's model. Nalebuff notes that "if Pb-c, the incremental sales would be at
a loss and there is no advantage to bundling. Nalebuff, Bundling as a Way, supra note 10,
at 6-7 (emphasis added). McAfee shows the general advantage of bundled pricing for all
cases except where B [the competitive product] is sold in a competitive market. McAfee,
McMillan & Whinston, supra, at 374. In two recent articles Herbert Hovenkamp and Erik
Hovenkamp also concluded that certain above-cost bundles, while exclusionary, can be
welfare enhancing. See Herbert Hovenkamp & Erik Hovenkamp, Exclusionary Bundled
Discount and the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 517, 527
(2008) [hereinafter Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, Exclusionary Bundled Discount]
(concluding that "the attribution test. ... is unreliable and yields false positives in the
presence of joint costs or economies of scope"); Herbert Hovenkamp & Erik Hovenkamp,
Complex Bundled Discounts and Antitrust Policy, 57 BUFF. L. R~v. 1227, 1255 (2009)
[hereinafter Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, Complex Bundled Discounts] (focusing on complex
bundles and noting that the Discount Attribution test "produces very severe false positives
and should be regarded as nothing more than a starting point for analysis").
98. Assuming the price for the monopolized product X is m and the price for the
competitive price of product Y is c, the monopolist in Nalebumfs model can maximize profits
by selling product A at a discount of (m - e) and product B at a premium of (c + 1).
Nalebuff, Bundling as a Way, supra note 10, at 11.
99. See id. at 4 (devising a model in which "the source of the gain is neither the
extraction of consumer surplus nor price discrimination"); see also Nalebuff, Exclusionary
Bundling, supra note 13, at 341 (noting that "while bundling for the purposes of price
discrimination is an interesting theoretical possibility, it may be of limited relevance to the
bundling cases seen in the courts"). Kobayashi's A Survey of the Economic Literature
provides the following example (based on Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, supra note 13,
at 339) to show the effect of such a bundle:
Suppose a representative individual's demand for Y is given by QY 1/4 100-pY,
and the demand for X is inelastic at 20. Under these conditions, the monopolist
that did not bundle ... would price Y at 50 and sell 50 units. X is sold at
[marginal] cost [assumed to be $10/unit] in a competitive market. If Y is
produced at zero marginal costs, total profits are 50 x 50 = 2500. Now suppose
that the monopolist lowered the price of Y to 49 only to those who also
purchased their 20 units of X at 11. At this price, profits from Y fall by 1 to 2499
(49x5 1). By taking the lower price on Y, the representative demander saves 50
(I on the 50 units he would have purchased at the monopoly price). In addition,
he gains the surplus associated with the 5 1st unit. He pays 20 more for the 20
units of X. In total, he is better off by at least 30. The monopolist is also better
off. He gives up 1 when he lowers the price of Y, but now makes an additional
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Nalebuff downplays the importance of bundling as a price discrimination
device.' 00 This Article, however, builds on the literature of bundling as a
discriminatory mechanism. A key insight is that the multi-product seller
can use bundling as a sorting mechanism to recapture some of the DWL
caused by monopoly pricing and increase its profits from the monopolized
product. Specifically, this section uses four stylized examples to show that
by making a choice between purchasing the monopolized product A, the
competitive product B or the bundle AB, the consumer reveals its
reservation price regarding the monopolized product and enables the
monopolist to price discriminate between low value and high value
consumers.'
0 '
To be sure, the argument advanced in this Article is not that bundling
can only be used to discriminate between consumers or that bundling (or
price discrimination for that matter) is always pro-competitive (they are
not).' 2  Instead, this Article argues that under certain circumstances,
20 on sales of X at the higher price.
Kobayashi, A Survey of the Economic Literature, supra note 38, at 730 n.66.
100. See Nalebuff, Bundling as a Way, supra note 10, at 4, 7 (devising a model in
which "[e]ssentially all consumers are attracted to this. ... bundle" and in which "the source
of the gain is neither the extraction of consumer surplus nor price discrimination"); see also
Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, supra note 13, at 341 (noting that "while bundling for the
purpose of price discrimination is an interesting theoretical possibility, it may be of limited
relevance to the bundling cases seen in the courts").
101. Unlike some of the literature on price discrimination, this Article's model does not
focus on situations where the bundler enjoys a monopoly in multiple product markets or
where the seller offers a pure bundle. Nor does it focus on bundles that aggregate consumer
values across products. See Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, supra note 86, at 160
("The literature on bundling as a price discrimination tool emphasizes that it works best
when the bundled goods have a negative correlation in value. This is when bundling most
reduces the dispersion in valuation and allows a monopolist to capture the lion's share of the
consumer surplus."); see also George J. Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on
Block-Booking, 1963 SUP. CT. REv. 152, 153 (1963) (showing how a seller that enjoys a
monopoly in two products can extract the consumer surplus using a bundling strategy that
requires the buyer to purchase both products to enjoy either). Rather, this Article shows that
mixed bundling can be an effective strategy to discriminate between consumers of a
monopolized product. In fact, this strategy can be so effective, that the seller may offer the
bundle even if it "loses" money from selling the competitive component of the bundle.
102. It is well known that the effects of imperfect (second or third degree) price
discrimination are ambiguous and often welfare-decreasing. See, e.g., Brief for Professor
Nalebuff et al. as Armici Curiae, supra note 86, at *2-.4, *10.19 (reviewing the literature and
arguing that the effects of price discrimination are ambiguous); Michael L. Katz, The
Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate Good Markets, 77
Am. EcoN. REv. 154, 155 (1987) (arguing that third degree price discrimination may either
increase or decrease welfare); Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy,
72 U. CmI. L. REv. 229, 235-3 6 (2005) (arguing that the effects of price discrimination are
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bundling can be a particularly strong strategy for allowing the seller to price
discriminate among its consumers, avoid arbitrage, reduce the harm of
monopoly pricing and enhance total welfare-even when the bundle is
exclusionary or below-cost.
This is illustrated by the examples below. Each of the examples is
similar to the one given by the Ortho court in that each discusses two
different product markets, one monopolized by a single firm and another in
which firms compete. It is different in that it relaxes the assumption that
the multi-product faces only one type of consumer. Instead, this Article
shows that when different types of consumers are present, a below-cost
bundle, regardless of its potential exclusionary effects, can be used as a
means to increase profits from the monopolized product, while at the same
time, enhancing total welfare.
1. Example 1: Exclusionary Bundles Can Increase Welfare
To receive wireless telephone services, consumers must buy hardware
(a cell phone) and also subscribe for service. Wireless telephone service
providers often enjoy a monopoly (or some degree of monopoly power)
over certain geographic areas. The monopoly can be complete (e.g., where
only one company offers services) or partial (e.g., where one company
enjoys a dominant position because it is the only one that provides complete
coverage). Unlike the wireless market, however, consumers can purchase
cell phones from a large number of manufacturers or from their wireless
provider. 103 A common practice by service providers is to offer a bundled
discount to consumers who commit to a two-year period.'04 The bundle
allows the consumer to receive the service at the regular rate, but the cell
welfare-decreasing, or ambiguous); Kathleen Carroll & Dennis Coates, Teaching Price
Discrimination: Some Clarification, 66 S. ECON. J. 466, 47 1-76 (1999) (noting that "the
efficiency effects depend on the type of price discrimination practiced by the firm" and that
in second degree and third degree price discrimination the welfare effects are ambiguous and
depend, among other things, on whether output increases).
103. See, e.g., Cell Phones & Devices, AT&T, http://www.wireless.att.comlcell-phone-
service/cell-phones/index.jsp (last visited Nov. 14, 2010) (listing numerous phones from
various manufacturers available for sale on the AT&T website) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
104. See, e.g., id (offering a bundled discount to purchasers of the Sony Ericsson
VV580i WalkmanqD, which includes the following features: 2.0 MP camera, Video recording
and playback, Stereo Bluetooth®, MP3s, streaming radio, FM Radio, fitness applications
and speakerphone). A different bundled discount is offered to purchasers of the very basic
PantechC 150. Id.
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phone is often offered at a discounted price and, in some situations, given
away for free.'05 Why would the service provider offer such a bundle? Is it
legal? After all, the discounted bundle can exclude cell phone
manufacturers from the market. The example below seeks to provide one
possible explanation. It shows that even when bundles are exclusionary and
priced below-cost, they can nevertheless be beneficial.
For simplicity, assume a local market with one wireless company,
WireCo, which enjoys a monopoly over phone services but competes with
others in the market for cell phones. In this market, there are two types of
consumers, each requiring the same service but a different type of cell
phone. Hip Consumers (HipC) require multimedia capabilities and other
sophisticated options, such as a pedometer and other fitness applications,
whereas Regular Consumers (RegC) require only basic wireless telephone
functions. There are only two types of cell phones, BlueBerries and
Vanillas. The BlueBerries are advanced devices that meet the needs of the
HipC. The Vanillas are simple, basic devices that satisfy the RegC.
Assume further that the incremental cost' 06 of the cell phones and wireless
service, their market price, and the consumers' reservation prices (for a
two-year program) are as described in Table 4. Also note that there are
only two consumers, the RegC and the HipC (each representing her group).
Table 4: Summary of Consumers' WTP, Sellers' Costs, and Market
Prices10 7
IHipC RegC IWireCo's Competitors' Market
IWTP WTP Avr. Cost Avr. Cost Price
Service 55 40 30 N/A WTP
IBlueBerriesi 60 22 I 60 I 60 60
Vanillas 5 22 20 18 20
105. Id (offering numerous significantly discounted or free cell phones when
purchased along with a two-year service contract).
106. Following the Ortho and Cascade decisions, the examples below use average
variable cost as a proxy for marginal cost. Ortho Diagnostics Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 466-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth,
515 F.3d 883, 909-10 (9th Cir. 2007). For a discussion as to the appropriate cost measure
for predatory pricing, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
107. Because consumers must purchase both a cell phone and service (whether in a
bundle or separately), the values in the table represent the consumers' willingness to pay for
cell phones and service, assuming consumers can purchase both (and zero otherwise). The
model assumes that the market for product B (the cell phone in Examples 1 and 2) is
competitive but not necessarily in fuill competition.
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If price discrimination were feasible, WireCo could maximize its
profits. Charging the HipC $55 and the RegC $40 would allow WireCo to
realize a profit of $35 (55+40-30-30). WireCo, however, cannot
distinguish between the two consumers because they both buy the same
service. Thus, to maximize its profits, WireCo must choose between one of
two options: It can either offer its services for $55 in which case it can
realize a profit of $25 (55-30); or it can offer its service for $40 and make a
profit of only $20 (40+40-30-30). WireCo would of course set the price
for its services at $55. As a result, the RegC would not be able to buy
services and therefore would be excluded from both markets (without the
ability to purchase wireless service, the RegC would not purchase a cell
phone).
A bundled discount can enable the seller to price discriminate between
consumers. The mechanism is simple: The consumer receives the choice
to purchase products A and B at full price or to purchase a package that
includes product A and product B at a discount. Product B is usually such
that only a specific type of consumer would buy it (and arbitrage is
impossible). By making a choice, the consumer reveals its preferences and
thus enables the seller to extract more profit. In our example, WireCo will
offer consumers the following options: (a) wireless services for $55; or
(b) a package that includes wireless services and a Vanilla phone for $62,
representing a discount of $13 (55+20-62). In addition, the consumer
would also be able to purchase from WireCo and other cell phone
manufacturers a BlueBerry for $60 and a Vanilla for $20.
A simple investigation shows that the bundle is Pareto-superior. The
HipC, who requires multimedia capabilities, will continue to buy service for
her BlueBerry for $55.108 The RegC, on the other hand, will now be able to
purchase the bundle because the cost of the bundle ($62) is equal to her
reservation price. Vanilla manufacturers are not worse off (they could not
sell any Vanilla phones to the RegC in the specific geographic market
before the bundle was offered) and WireCo is clearly better off. Its profits
increase by $12 (WireCo charges the RegC $62 for a bundle that costs $50).
Total output will double and total welfare will increase by $12. The bundle
is clearly efficient, but is it legal? Can the bundle be successfully
108. The HipC will not pay $62 for a bundle she only values at $60. Note that arbitrage
in this example is impossible. The HipC cannot purchase the discounted bundle (which
includes the Vanilla and service), resell the Vanilla, and use the (cheap) service together
with a BlueBerry. The reason is that the service is only provided to the cell phone device
registered with WireCo. This assumption is relaxed in Example 3, which demonstrates that
a multi-product seller can use the bundle itself to prevent arbitrage.
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challenged on the grounds that it excludes a more efficient competitor from
the Vanilla market? Under the Cascade test:
To prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or predatory for the
purposes of a monopolization or attempted monopolization claim under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must establish that, after allocating
the discount given by the defendant on the entire bundle of products to
the competitive product or products, the defendant sold the competitive
product or products below its average variable cost of producing
them.'09
In applying the Cascade test to the example, we must subtract the entire
$13 discount from the $20 separate-per-unit price of the competitive price
of Vanilla cell phones. The result is $7, meaning that in order to compete
with the bundle, competitors must offer Vanilla phones at a price of $7. In
such a case, the RegC would be indifferent between (a) purchasing the
Vanilla cell phone for $7 and the service for $55 separately; and
(b) purchasing a bundle of both for $62. Competitors, however, would not
be able to offer a Vanilla for $7 because it costs them $18 to manufacture
one unit. The Vanilla's effective price ($7) is also below WireCo's cost
($20). The result is that Vanilla manufacturers would be excluded (or
blocked) from the local market in which WireCo enjoys a monopoly over
services. Absent a business justification defense, this exclusionary effect is
considered predatory and thus illegal.110 WireCo's bundle excludes more
efficient competitors from the market (competitors can manufacture a
Vanilla at a cost of $18, $2 less than WireCo) and enables WireCo to
"leverage" its monopoly power over the service market to the Vanilla
market.
The Cascade (or "discount attribution") test is premised on the
assumption that "the primary anticompetitive danger posed by a multi-
product bundled discount is that such a discount can exclude a rival who is
equally efficient at producing the competitive product simply because the
rival does not sell as many products as the bundled discounter.""' But as
shown above, excluding competitors--even more efficient ones-can be
welfare enhancing. Unlike predatory pricing in the single product context,
exclusionary bundles-those targeted by the Cascade decision--can be
beneficial. Importantly, the Cascade court did not adopt the position
109. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 910.
110. Provided that "the other elements of a specific intent to monopolize and dangerous
probability of success are satisfied." Id. at 903 n.13.
I111. Id. at 909.
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advocated by many commentators that even after satisfy'ing the discount
allocation test the plaintiff must show that the discount was not only
exclusionary but also one that cannot be justified by efficiencies or other
business justifications." 2  While the Cascade court may not have been
required to directly decide the issue, a number of its statements suggest that
if the other elements of § 2' 13 are satisfied, bundles that fail the discount
attribution test-that is, bundles that exclude more efficient competitors-
will be condemned as illegal." 
4
Note that "monopolizing" the Vanilla market generated additional
profits for WireCo. Absent bundling, WireCo would offer its services for
$55 and would realize a profit of only $25 (55-30). Had it been able to
discriminate fuilly between its consumers, WireCo could have gained a
profit of $35. The bundle, on the other hand, allowed WireCo to earn $37:
$35 from the services and $2 from the Vanilla."15 WireCo's conduct,
however, was based on a legitimate business justification. This justification
was not to push manufacturers out of the Vanilla market, to monopolize
112. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text (expressing concerns that a strict
application of the Cascade standard may cause welfare enhancing bundles to be deemed
illegal and calling, at the very least, for the explicit adoption of a business justification
defense).
113. See Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (making it illegal to
"imonopolize [or] attempt to monopolize .. , any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations").
114. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2007)
("This standard makes the defendant's bundled discounts legal unless the discounts have the
potential to exclude a hypothetical equally efficient producer of the competitive product.").
The Court stated:
Thus, a plaintiff who challenges a package discount as anticompetitive must
prove that, when the full amount of the discounts given by the defendant is
allocated to the competitive product or products, the resulting price of the
competitive product or products is below the defendant's incremental cost to
produce them. This requirement ensures that the only bundled discounts
condemned as exclusionary are those that would exclude an equally efficient
producer of the competitive product or products.
Id. at 909. The court went on to hold that in order to prove that a bundled discount is an
anticompetitive violation under § 2, "the plaintiff must establish that, after allocating the
discount given by the defendant on the entire bundle of products to the competitive product
or products, the defendant sold the competitive product or products below its average
variable cost of producing them." Id. at 910. Moreover, although the Cascade court referred
twice to the "legitimate business justification" element, once in describing the LePage 's
standard and again when relying on Areeda and Hovenkamp to reject the Ortho standard, it
failed to include that business justification element as part of its test. Id. at 898, 907.
115. This includes $25 from selling services to the HipC (55-30) and $12 from selling
the bundle to the RegC (40+22-30-20).
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that market, or to realize the extra $2 from selling Vanilla phones. Instead,
it was to increase profits (which it did) by discriminating between
consumers in order to realize more profits on its monopolized product, the
services. The bundle allowed WireCo to keep selling the monopolized
product (wireless services) at the high price of $55 to the HipC, while at the
same time offering the exact same service to the RegC for only $40 (in the
eyes of the RegC, the service was sold at a price of $40 and the phone at
$22). Indeed, as the next example demonstrates, even when a monopolist
loses money from bundling a competitive product, bundling may
nevertheless be profitable if the benefit from extracting the consumers'
surplus from the monopolized product outweighs the loss from bundling a
competitive product. Moreover, as shown above, the bundle not only
increased WireCo's profit, but it also increased total welfare and output. To
summarize, a bundled discount that fails the Cascade standard can be not
only output-enhancing but can also avoid some of the very ills that result
from the multi-product power over the monopolized product.
But does WireCo really need to offer a bundle in order to engage in
price discrimination? One may argue that there are simpler and cheaper
ways to discriminate between consumers. A service provider, for example,
can learn about a consumer by checking the serial number of the
consumer's phone (a number the consumer must provide in order to receive
service). In our example, WireCo could offer a different price for its
services according to the device the consumer owns. It could charge one
price for BlueBerry enthusiasts and a different price for Vanilla owners.
Wireless companies, however, do not do so. AT&T, for example, offers the
same service package to all users regardless of the device they own.16
Why does AT&T (or WireCo in our example) not price discriminate
consumers according to the cell phone they own? One reason is that price
discrimination using a serial number (albeit technologically feasible) is too
costly. Such an explicit and direct method can simply be bad for public
relations and is likely to upset consumers. The following anecdotal
example is illustrative. In September 2000, Amazon.com was accused of
offering the same DVIs to different customers at discounts of thirty to
forty percent." 7 According to news reports, "Amazon said it was a random
116. With one exception: BlackBerry and iPhone users must pay an additional fee for a
"data package." See Interview with AT&T's Online Live Agent and AT&T Website (July
28, 2008) (displaying an online chat inquiring into the different discounts and service
packages offered based on phone model and serial number).
117. See Declan McCullagh, Should Amazon. corn Be Able to Charge You More Than
Someone Else?, CNET NEws BLOG (May 4, 2007, 9:41 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
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price test, but after criticism, it decided to refund the difference to anyone
paying the higher price and pledged not to do it again." 1 8  As Amazon
learned, upsetting consumers can be very costly. This is especially the case
when a firm (such as WireCo) enjoys a monopoly over one geographic
market but faces fierce competition in others. Although the monopolist's
consumers might end up purchasing its services in the monopolized area, in
markets where WireCo competes with other service providers, consumers
may "punish" the monopolist by choosing to use other providers. For
example, in the New York area where WireCo may compete with AT&T,
T-Mobile, and Verizon, consumers aware of WireCo's behavior in the
monopolized market would prefer to purchase Verizon' s services.'"9
It is important to note that this Article does not argue that price
discrimination is the only reason to bundle. Indeed, there can be many
reasons for bundling, some of which are mentioned above. It only argues
that price discrimination, under certain circumstances, can be an important
and a legitimate justification for which courts should pay attention when
applying the Cascade test.
2. Example 2: Predatory (Below-Cost) Bundles Can Enhance Welfare
In the example above, the bundle enabled WireCo to increase its
profits from both phone ($2) and service ($35) sales. It is also possible to
show that even "classic" predatory pricing behavior-selling a product
below its actual cost, and thus at a loss-can be not only profitable and
sustainable but also pro-competitive and welfare-enhancing as well. To
illustrate, assume that the service and hardware market are the same as the
10784_3-9715959-7.html?hhTest=1I (last visited Nov. 14, 2010) (arguing that while some
worry about the harmful effects of price discrimination, a law prohibiting it is not necessary)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
118. Id.
119. A quick survey of AT&T's website implies that AT&T engages in price
discrimination by bundling services and phones in the method described above. On July 28,
2008, AT&T offered a refurbished Sony Ericsson W580i Walkman® for $19.99,
representing a discount of $230 from its $249.99 retail price. See Cell Phones & Devices,
AT&T, http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phone-service/cell-phones/cell-phones.jsp? (last
visited Nov. 14, 2010) (listing AT&T's online selection of cell phones and devices) (on file
with Washington and Lee Law Review). A Pantech Cl150, a less sophisticated phone valued
at a retail price of 199.99, was offered for "free." Id Both "deals" were conditioned on a
two-year service contract. Id. AT&T offers the same service packages to all phone owners
regardless of phone type. Id. The discounts above are offered only on the "cell phone"
component of the package. Id.
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previous example, except that WireCo's cost of manufacturing a Vanilla is
$24. Remember that the Vanilla manufacturers offer their product
nationwide at a price of $20 a unit. Table 5 below summarizes the market
conditions.
Table 5: Summary of Consumers' WTP, Sellers' Costs, and Market Prices
HipC RegC WireCo's Competitors' Market
WTP WTP Avr. Cost Avr. Cost Price
Service 55 40 30 N/A WTP
BlueBerries 60 22 60 60 60
Vanillas 5 22 24 18 20
As discussed above, if price discrimination is infeasible (because it is
impossible to distinguish between consumers), WireCo will charge $55 for
wireless services and RegC would be excluded from the market. 20
Although selling a Vanilla is not profitable to WireCo (WireCo's
manufacturing cost of $24 is higher than the market price of $20 and the
consumers' WTP of $22), bundling a Vanilla with its services is feasible,
sustainable, and profitable. Consumers would be able to buy the following
products and services: (a) a Vanilla at $20; (b) a Blueberry at $60; and
(c) services at $55. I addition, WireCo would also offer a bundle that
includes a Vanilla and services for $62 (a $13 discount: 55+20-62). Once
again, the bundle would be socially desirable. The HipC would continue to
purchase the same service at the same price of $55 and would not be worse
off. The RegC, on the other hand, would clearly be better off. She would
be able to purchase a phone and service for her reservation price of $62
($22 for the phone and $40 for the service), something she could not do
before the "predatory bundle" was offered. As a result, bundling would
allow WireCo to increase its profits by selling its services to the HipC for a
profit of $25 (55-30), while and at the same time selling the bundle to the
RegC for a profit of $8 (62-30-24).
WireCo sells a Vanilla below its cost. The Vanilla is offered on the
market for $20 but it costs WireCo $24 to manufacture (or buy'121)a unit. In
the eyes of the consumer who buys the bundle for $62, the service
component in the bundle costs $40 and the Vanilla component $22. This
means that WireCo is losing $2 from selling a Vanilla (22-24) but profits
$10 from selling services (40-3 0). Selling Vanillas, however, is profitable
120. Supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
121. Assuming that WireCo purchases the product on the market for $20 and incurs
additional costs (such as transportation and handling) of $4.
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because WireCo's total profits increase by $8 (10-2). 122 Put differently,
WireCo is "paying" (or "investing," or "sacrificing") a premium of $2 to
enable a price discrimination activity that yields an additional profit of $ 10.
Consequently, because the bundle enables more users (the RegC) to buy
phones and services and thus increase output and total welfare, the
"predatory" behavior is both profitable and welfare-enhancing. A quick
survey of AT&T's website reveals bundling below-cost. Although the cost
to manufacture a cell phone is clearly positive, AT&T offers discounted
bundles in which some of the cell phones are offered for "free"--clearly
below any measure of cost.'
The bundle is socially desirable but it is exclusionary. It flunks the
Exclusionary Standard enunciated by Cascade, Ortho, and the AMC if
strictly applied (for the reasons discussed in Example 1) and may thus be
declared as predatory. 2 In fact, the discounted package could be said to be
predatory without even resorting to any bundling analysis. As Professor
Crane notes:
In some cases, a multiproduct discount may result in below-cost pricing
in one or more of the covered markets without any need to resort to
complicated discount-reallocation accounting. If the marginal cost of
items X, Y, and Z is $8, their pre-bundled price was $10, and the
bundled offer is a 30% discount on each item if they are bought
together, then the price of each item may be below its marginal cost.
Ordinary predatory pricing rules could be applied to the package
discount. The same could obtain if only one item in the bundle was
below its cost after the bundled offer. May and could are italicized
because the bundled discount may have arisen from transactional or cost
savings from selling in the package. 
125
122. In the eyes of other producers (and under the "discount allocation" test) the
effective price of Vanillas is $7, well below the cost of efficient competitors. See Cascade
Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 n.14 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the
alternative names for the standard announced in Cascade, including "discount attribution"
test and "discount reallocation" test). Because the bundle represents a discount of $13
(55+20-62), in order to compete with WireCo, manufacturers would have to offer their
Vanillas at $7 (20-13), making consumers indifferent to (i) purchasing the bundle for $62;
or (ii) purchasing services separately for $55 and Vanillas for $7.
123. See supra note 32 (noting the different views as to the appropriate below cost
measure).
124. See supra Part III (discussing predatory bundling in the multi-product setting).
125. Crane, Mixed Bundling, supra note 37, at 473-74. Professor Crane warns "that
further caution is warranted when the package discount results in a nominal below-cost price
of a single item but revenues from other products continue to cover their costs," and noting
that "[ilf the seller is using the package discount to play behavioral games or exploit client
agency costs, it might hope that the presentation of one very low price in the package would
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In the example above, however, the competitive product in the
bundle, the Vanilla, is priced below-cost, not because of "transactional or
cost savings from selling in the package.0 26  Rather, selling the
competitive product, even if at a loss, allows the bundler to discriminate
between consumers and thereby increase its profits. The bundle, one
which increases consumers' and total welfare, may thus be considered
predatory under the Brooke Group test for predatory pricing. 
12 7
3. Example 3: Bundling Can Prevent Arbitrage
Price discrimination may be the wish of every monopolist, but it is
not always feasible. Many times, consumers can engage in arbitrage. To
be able to price discriminate between consumers, the monopolist must
make sure that the consumer with the high WTP will not purchase the
discounted bundle, dispose the second product and just consume the
monopolized product. In some industries, as is the case with wireless
service providers (where service is given to a specific phone identified by
a unique ID), a monopolist can avoid arbitrage through the use of
technology. In many industries, however, arbitrage is still possible. A
monopolist may use bundled discounts to overcome this problem.
The following example is illustrative. Assume that an airline has a
monopoly over a specific route (e.g., from Birmingham, AL (BHM) to
Chicago, IL (ORD)) and that next to each airport there are two-star hotels
that only serve passengers. The airline services two types of consumers
(each representing a different group of customers): A business consumer
(BizC) and a nonbusiness consumer (NBC). The BizC values the airline
ticket more than the NBC, while the NBC values a night at a two-star
hotel more than the BizC. Assume further that the consumers' WTP, the
manufacturers' costs and the market prices for airline tickets and hotel
services are as described below.
help to stimulate demand." Id. at 474.
126. Id.
127. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-
24 (1993) (stating that in order to prove predatory pricing the plaintiff must show: (1) that
the defendant priced its product below cost, and (2) that the alleged predator had "a
dangerous probability of recouping its investment in below-cost pricing").
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Table 6: Summary of Consumers' WTP, Sellers' Costs and Market Prices
BizC NBC Airline Competing Market
WTP WTP AVC Hotels AVG Price
Airline 10 70 5N/ T
(BHM-ORD) 10 70 5N/WT
Two-Star Hotel 25 80 60 59 60
The airline can maximize its profits by charging each consumer a
different price. By charging the BizC $100 and the NBC $70, the airline
would realize a profit of $70 (100+70-50-50). Price discrimination,
however, is often infeasible. Even if the airline could distinguish between
the two types of consumers (a daunting task in and of itself), arbitrage
would still frustrate any attempt to price discriminate. The NBC who is
offered the cheaper price ($70) could purchase the ticket at a discounted
price and then resell it to the high-value consumer (the BizC in our
example) below the monopolist's price ($100). Moreover, the high-value
consumer could easily disguise herself as a low-value consumer. When
asked whether she is purchasing a ticket for business, she could simply say:
"No."
If price discrimination is infeasible, the airline must decide between
charging consumers $100 or charging them $70. If the airline charges $70
for a ticket, it will sell two tickets (one to each consumer) and make a profit
of only $40 (70+70-50-50); but if the airline charges $100, it will sell only
one ticket (to the BizC) and realize a profit of $50 (100-50). Because
selling a ticket at $100 is more profitable ($50 compared to $40), the NBC,
although willing to pay $20 more than the cost of the flight, will not be able
to fly from Birmingham to Chicago.
A bundled discount can help the monopolist achieve the two conditions
necessary for price discrimination. It enables the airline to (1) distinguish
between the different consumers and (2) avoid arbitrage. The mechanism is
simple: The airline will offer the consumer the option of purchasing (a) a
ticket for $ 100; or (b) a bundle of a ticket and a stay at a local two-star hotel
at $128.99. For simplicity, assume that in order for the airline to offer the
bundle, it must first acquire (or enter into an agreement with) a hotel that
incurs a cost of $60 per night. In addition, consumers would be able to
make reservations directly with any two-star hotel for $60 a night (the
market price for similar hotel services).
The NBC, facing the option of (a) buying a ticket for $100 and making
a reservation at a two-star hotel for $60 (a total expense of $160), or
(b) buying a bundle of both for $128.99, will of course choose the latter.
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The bundle allows the NBC to purchase a ticket she could not have
purchased absent the bundle and even enjoy a surplus of $21.01 (150-
128.99). At the same time, bundling enables the airline-monopolist to
realize a profit of $68.99 (100+128.99-50-50-60), $18.99 (or thirty-eight
percent) more compared to a situation in which it does not bundle. This is
because the bundle offers the low-value consumer a deal which is below the
consumer's reservation price, while at the same time offering a higher price
to the high-value consumer. The bundle also frustrates any attempt for
arbitrage because the BizC in our example has no incentive to purchase the
bundle. She would purchase a ticket for $100 and decline to purchase at
$128.99, a bundle she values for $125.
The bundled discount is socially desirable, but is it legal? Under a
strict application of the Cascade test, it is not. 128 Under this test, the
discount given by the bundler is allocated to the competitive product .12 9 If
the resulting price of the competitive product is below the bundler's
average (incremental) cost of production, then the bundled discount is
exclusionary for the purpose of § 2. Applying this test to the example, we
need to subtract the entire discount of $3 1.01 (the difference between the
aggregate fuill price of the products, $160, and the bundle's price, $128.99)
from the market price of hotel services, $60. The result is $28.99 (60-
31.01), which is below the airline's average cost of supplying the hotel
services ($60). Thus, a court strictly applying the Cascade standard would
hold that the airline's bundle--one which increases total welfare and
output-excludes more efficient hotels which offer similar services (at $59)
but are not "affiliated" with the airline and is thus predatory.
The Cascade test is right in its conclusion that the effective price (in
the eyes of competitors at least) of the hotel service component in the
bundle is $28.99. Indeed, to make a customer indifferent to purchasing the
bundle or purchasing each of its components separately, the competing
hotels must offer their services at $28.99. The Cascade test is also correct
to conclude that this price is below the airline's average cost and that it
excludes equally or more efficient competitors (other hotels that can
provide accommodations at the same or lower price). Yet the airline's
behavior should not be considered "predatory." The airline is not trying to
leverage its monopoly to the hotel services market. It is simply trying
(successfully) to maximize its profit on the monopolized product-the
airline ticket--by price discriminating between high-value and low-value
128. Supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
129. Supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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consumers. Under the Exclusionary Standard, by selling hotel services at
the effective price of $28.99, the airline is selling below cost and is
incurring a loss of $31.01 (28.99-60). But this is merely a small sacrifice
that enables the airline to harvest a $50 (100-5O) profit from the low-value
consumer of the monopolized product, and a net profit of $18.99 (50-
31.01). The result is that, in the bundling context, even when the bundler
excludes (by either causing sellers to exit the market for the competitive
product or by blocking entry to that market) a more efficient competitor, the
bundle can be welfare-enhancing, and if so, should not be condemned as
predatory.
4. Example 4: Unrelated Products
The Ortho example focused on complements (shampoo and
conditioners)130 and so did Examples 1-3 above. In these examples,
consumers were offered the option to buy cell phones with wireless
services, and hotel services with airline tickets. The results of the model,
however, are not limited to complements. The following example
(a variant of Example 1) is illustrative. Assume that a multi-product seller
enjoys a monopoly over one product, A, but competes with others on the
sale of a second product, B. Assume further that competitors in the B
market are more efficient (they can manufacture B for less) and that there
are three types of consumers. The consumers' reservation prices, the
market prices and the manufacturing incremental costs are described below.
Table 7: Summary of Consumers' WTP, Sellers' Incremental Costs and
Market Prices
Multi- Cmeios Mre
C1 C2 C3 Product Copeitr Mrkcet
______ __ ___ ___Seller AVC AVPrc
A 55 40 0 30 N/A WTP
B *2 22 22 20 18 20
Bundle 157 162 122T 50 N/A 57.99
As in Example 1, if the multi-product seller cannot discriminate
between consumers, it will charge $55 for product A and realize a profit of
$25 (55-30). The result will be that Type 2 consumers would be excluded
from the A market (they will not pay $55 for a product they value at $40).
130. Ortho Diagnostic Sys. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455. 467 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
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Note that pure bundling (selling A and B only as part of the package
AB) would be a losing strategy. If the pure bundle is offered at $62 (to
extract Type 2 consumers' surplus) no one will purchase the bundle. Type
I and Type 3 consumers would not pay $62 for a bundle they value at $57
and $22 respectively. Type 2 consumers would not purchase the bundle
because the bundle's price is equal to their reservation price and would
leave them without any surplus. They would rather purchase product B for
$20 and enjoy a surplus of $2 (22-20). A pure bundle at a price of $59.99
would also be a losing strategy. Type 2 consumers would purchase the
bundle (Type I and 3 consumers wouldn't), but the multi-product seller
would only realize a profit of $9.99 (59.99-50). Between monopoly-
pricing (selling product A for $55) that yields $25 in profits and a pure
bundle that yields a profit of $9.99, the multi-product seller would stick to
monopoly-pricing.
A mixed bundling strategy, however, can allow the multi-product
seller to reduce and recapture some of the DWL caused by the monopoly
pricing and even some of the DWL caused by the supra-competitive prices
charged in product B's market. The multi-product seller will continue
offering product A for $55 and product B for $20. In addition, it will offer
the bundle AB for $57.99. 13
Type 1 consumers will keep purchasing product A for $55 and will not
be affected by the bundle at all. Type 2 consumers who could not purchase
product A because of the monopoly pricing will purchase the bundle AB for
$57.99 and enjoy a surplus of $4.01 (62-5 7.99). The multi-product seller
will also increase its profits by $7.99 (57.99-50) from $25 to $32.99 (due to
the sale of the bundle to Type 2 consumers).
131. The multi-product seller will not be able to offer the bundle AB for $59.99 because
such a price may result in a price war. If the seller offers the bundle for $59.99, Type 2
consumers will enjoy a surplus of $2.01 (62-59.99) from purchasing the bundle.
Competitors who manufacture product B will then reduce the price for B to $19.98 (it costs
them only $18 to manufacture product B), which will allow Type 2 consumers to enjoy a
surplus of $2.02 (22-19.98). Faced with the option of (i) purchasing the bundle AB from the
multi-product seller for $59.99 and enjoying a surplus of $2.01, or (ii) just purchasing
product B and enjoying a surplus of $2.02, the consumer will prefer the latter. As a result,
the multi-product seller will reduce the price of the bundle to $59.97. Competitors in the B
market will then reduce the price of product B even further. This price war will continue
until the price for product B is reduced to $18. The multi-product seller will then offer the
bundle at a price of $57.99, which will allow Type 2 consumers to enjoy a $4.01 (62-57.99)
surplus. Product B competitors will not reduce the price firther (below $18) because it costs
them $18 to manufacture product B. With Type 2 consumers out of reach (due to the
exclusionary bundle), product B competitors-focusing on Type 3 consumers-will raise the
price back up to $20.
275
1276 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231 (2010)








-- -- - - .
---------






II ...I I .................... ...
-0 ,C"? 4-21 '4G) ........
...........................
........... . . . . I , . . . , . . .. ... I. .: - .' N............
... .... Avc(A)
711, R

















PREDA TOR Y B UNDLING 1277
3(C) AcB
Product A ---------
$57.99 .... ... ...
1(2, 55) 13u2&B 0 44)'
NJ J. A&B. N
I .,~/ BtuiyBAvc(A)
$30 ........~
$2.99 $19 57.99 B
Once again, the bundle is welfare-enhancing but it is exclusionary with
regard to Type 2 consumers. These consumers will not purchase product B
from the more efficient competitors, but will instead prefer to purchase the
bundle AB from the less efficient multi-product seller. Type 3 consumners-
those who are only interested in purchasing the competitive product B,
however-will still be able to purchase product B from the competitors or
the multi-product seller. In fact, the more efficient competitors will be able
to exclude the multi-product seller from selling product B to Type 3
consumers if they offer product B for $19.99 (below the multi-product
seller's cost to produce product B).
Graphically, the implications fromn offering a bundled discount are
represented in Figure 3 (above). In a fully competitive market, described in
Figure 3(A), consumers located in the (dotted) area AEHL (who value both
products more than their cost of production) would be able to purchase both
products. Consumers located in the area AEPO (marked by horizontal
lines) would purchase only product A, and those located in area EZRH
(marked by vertical lines) would purchase only product B. Products A and
B are not priced, however, at the competitive level. Because both products
are priced above their cost of production there is some DWL some of which
is shown in Figure 3(B). Consumers located in the area denoted as L)WL I
who could purchase both products will not be able to purchase any of the
products. Consumers located in the area denoted as DWL2 will only be
able to purchase product A and those located in the area denoted as DWL3
will only be able to purchase product B. In addition, consumers located in
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the area BYPE (who could purchase product A) and consumers located in
the area EZFX (who could purchase product B) will purchase neither good.
The bundle reduces some of the DWL caused by the monopoly pricing
and even some of the DWL caused by the supra-competitive prices charged
for product B. Specifically, consumers who value the bundle at $57.99
(those located on the line KJ and outward) will be able to purchase both.
The increase in welfare is shown in Figure 3(C) by a transformation of
some of the gray DWL areas in Figure 3(B) to the white-dotted areas.1
32
Specifically, consumers located in the area ABCD (DWL2) who could only
purchase product A, those located in the area CINJ (part of DWL3) who
could only purchase product B, and consumers located in the area BKJC
(part of DWL 1) who could not purchase any of the products, will be able to
purchase both.13 3
VI. Conclusion
As one of the leading treatises notes:
The theory of anticompetitive discounting is in much the same position
as the theory of predatory pricing was in the 1 970s: No shortage of
132. Formally, there are two conditions that must be satisfied for the consumer to buy a
bundle. First, the consumer must value the bundle more than the cost of the bundle. Second,
the consumer will not purchase the bundle if purchasing a single product would leave her
with more surplus. Denoting WTPA and WTPB as the consumer willingness to pay for each
product, and Pm, Pc and PB as the price of the monopolized good, the competitive product
and the bundle respectively, these conditions can be reformulated as follows: (1) WTPm +
WTPc P1, and (2) WTPM + WTPc - PB ! WTPm - Pm (or WTPc : PB - PM) and WTPM +
WTPC - PB ! WT~c - Pc (or WTPm ? PB -PC)-
133. Note that the bundle may also create some DWL. In a competitive market,
consumers who are located in the area ABKTS in Figure 3(C) will not (and should not)
purchase product B because they value product B less than its cost. The bundle, however,
may lead to inefficiency if consumers have reservation prices that would locate them in this
area. For example, in a competitive market, a consumer located in the area ASTB who
values product A at $60 and product B at $10 will purchase only product A and enjoy a
surplus of $30 (60-30). With monopoly pricing and absent mixed bundling she will still be
able to consume product A although her surplus would decrease from $30 to $5 (60-55).
But if the seller offers the bundle AB at a discounted price of $57.99, the consumer will
purchase both products in order to enjoy a surplus of $12.01 (60+10-57.99), more than twice
the surplus absent bundling. A consumer who values product A at $50 and B at $17 (located
in the area TBK) would be able to purchase product A in a fully competitive market but not
product B (recall that the cost of products A and B are $30 and $18, respectively). If the
seller charges $55 for product A she will not be able to purchase either product. But she will
purchase a bundle of both if the seller offers a bundled discount of $57.99 and enjoy a
surplus of $9.01 (50+17-57.99). Purchasing product A reduces the DWL from monopoly
pricing but it creates inefficiency in the production of product B.
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theories, but a frightening inability of courts to assess them. It is one
thing to develop a theory showing that a particular practice can be
anticompetitive. It is quite another to show that this theory explains a
particular practice without producing an unacceptably high number of
false positives.' 34
The Cascade court was aware of the fact that its test may sweep too
broadly. In fact, it invited the legal academy to investigate this very
issue.13' This Article accepts the invitation. It argues that the Exclusionary
Standard adopted by Cascade and the AMC creates a real concern that
output and welfare-enhancing bundles will be declared illegal,,3 6 and that
its strict application will harm consumers. It will subject certain socially
desirable bundling schemes to unnecessary and costly scrutiny. Under
Cascade (and the AMC):
[Tio prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or predatory for the
purposes of a monopolization or attempted monopolization claim under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must establish that, after allocating
the discount given by the defendant on the entire bundle of products to
the competitive product or products, the defendant sold the competitive
product or products below its.. .cost of producing them.'1
37
Pricing "below cost" is considered predatory because it excludes equal or
more efficient competitors from the market. thereby harming competition
and consumers.'
But while true in the single-product case, this Article argues that this
assumption does not always hold in the multi-product context. A multi-
product seller may have a legitimate economic incentive to bundle a
134. AREEDA & HovENKAmp, supra note 37, at 306.
135. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 908 (9th Cir. 2007).
136. A similar concern was raised by Commissioners Carlton and Garza:
Commissioners Carlton and Garza join this recommendation, but are concerned
that the first screen in the three-part test would still require many pricing
schemes where exclusion is not at issue to receive further scrutiny under the
second and third parts of the test. Bundled discounts that do not pass the first
screen in the Commission's proposed test can be used to price discriminate with
no exclusionary effect on competition. Failure to recognize that price
discrimination is a motive for mixed bundling implies that the incremental
revenue is not correctly calculated by the Commission's proposal.
Commissioner Carlton elaborates on these points in his separate statement.
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 7, at 99.
137. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 910.
138. See id. at 909 (noting that the below cost "requirement ensures that the only
bundled discounts condemned as exclusionary are those that would exclude an equally
efficient producer of the competitive product or products" (emphasis added)).
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monopolized product with a competitive product. In fact, this economic
incentive may be so strong that the multi-product seller may offer the
bundle at a substantial discount and even "below cost." Such bundled
discounts may indeed exclude more efficient competitors, either because
competitors cannot match the discount offered or simply because they
cannot offer the same diverse line of products. Yet, this Article shows that
the benefits from the "below-cost-exclusionary" bundle can outweigh the
cost of excluding competitors.
By offering a bundled discount, the bundler may be able to
discriminate between groups of consumers holding different reservation
prices, and even use the bundle to prevent arbitrage. Under the conditions
discussed above, the discounted bundle may mitigate the main harm of the
monopoly: Reduced output and deadweight loss. In fact, it may even
reduce inefficiencies in the competitive product market. This is because the
competitive product in the bundle serves as a self-sorting mechanism that
enables the bundler to sell the monopolized product to consumers who
would purchase the product had it been offered in a competitive market, but
cannot and will not purchase it absent the bundle. This increase in welfare
can more than offset the exclusionary effect and may even be Pareto-
superior.
This Article recognizes that bundling (pure or mixed) may have
anticompetitive or detrimental effects. 3 9 But it warns against a strict
application of the Cascade test under which a monopolist that excludes an
equal or more efficient competitor harms competition and should therefore
be liable under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Instead, it argues that in the
multi-product context, exclusionary behavior and even pricing a product in
the bundle below-cost can be welfare-enhancing. Therefore, if not wrong,
the Cascade-AMC standard is,' at the very least, overbroad. 140 It creates a
real concern that courts applying the Cascade-AMC test will declare illegal
below-cost (thus exclusionary) yet welfare-desirable bundles. This will
especially be the case if, when applying the test, courts fail to consider
legitimate business justifications (whether as part of the plaintiff's prima
139. Supra notes 94, 134.
140. See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 908 (9th Cir. 2007)
("Liability under the discount attribution standard has the potential to sweep more broadly
than under the aggregate discount rule or the Ortho standard. However, there is limited
judicial experience with bundled discounts, and academic inquiry into the competitive
effects of bundled discounts is only beginning."); see also Lamnbert, supra note 79, at 1 730-
43 (criticizing the test and offering an alternative approach).
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facie case or as an affirmative defense). 14 ' How big is the concern and
whether the Exclusionary Standard will produce "an unacceptable high
number of false positives" (condemning desirable bundles) should be the
subject of future empirical testing. But courts and policy makers should be
aware that in the context of bundling, exclusionary does not necessarily mean
predatory. Rather, "predatory bundling," that is, offering a bundle that
excludes a more efficient competitor and even a bundle in which a product is
priced below-cost, can be not only sustainable and profitable but also
welfare-enhancing.
The possibility that courts may apply the Exclusionary Standard in a per
se manner was not ignored by Commissioner Carlton (although absent in the
AMC report). 142  In a separate statement, Commissioner Carlton warned
141. See also Frank Easterbrook, The Chicago School and Exclusionary Conduct,
HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 439, 445 (2009) ("Only if the gains from the successfuil suits
exceed the losses from the false positives can we say that litigation about exclusionary
practices has been a success."). Easterbrook explains that "judges and enforcers must be
wary of claims that take the form: 'Here is a model in which bad results can happen; let's
use the legal system to find out whether they happen.' That approach assumes away the
costs of false positives." Id.
142. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 7, at 94-100, 399; see also
Virgin Atd. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.
1999), aff'd, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Ortho as holding "that there would be an
antitrust violation if the competitive product in the bundle were sold for a price below
average variable cost after the discounts on the monopoly items in the bundle were
subtracted from the price of that competitive product"); Hovenkamp & Hovenkamnp,
Exclusionary Bundled Discount, supra note 97, at 519 (noting that the Discount Attribution
test "has the potential to sweep far too broadly, particularly if it becomes a de facto prima
facie test of illegality"); id at 519 (concluding that in "[Cascade] the Ninth Circuit appeared
to assume that any bundled discount that flunks the attribution test is at least presumptively
anticompetitive"); Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, Complex Bundled Discounts, supra note 97,
at 25 (noting that the Discount Attribution test "produces very severe false positives and
should be regarded as nothing more than a starting point for analysis"). In 2006-2007 the
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) held
joint hearings to study issues relating to § 2 enforcement including bundling. See Press
Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Issues Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law
(Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/Press-releases!
2008/236975.pdf (announcing the report). The report, published on September 8, 2008,
adopted the Cascade-AMC's Discount Allocation test as a safe harbor (in situations where
bundle-to-bundle competition is impossible) and warned against a "presumption of
anticompetitive conduct." DOJ, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, supra note 17, at 101-02.
The report was rejected, however, by the FTC. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
STATEMENT OF COMISSIONERS HARBOUR, LEIBOWITZ AND RoSCH ON THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SECTION 2 REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1 (2008), available at http:I/
ftc.gov/os/2008/09/080908section2stmnt.pdf (providing the Commissioners' statements). In a
separate statement, Commissioners Harbour, Leibowitz, and Rosch noted that the DOJ's
report, if adopted, would lead to "radically weakened enforcement" and criticized the DOJ's
interpretation of Section 2 jurisprudence noting that "the final Report's descriptions and
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against such application. If the discount attribution test "is adopted by
courts," warned Commissioner Carlton, "they must understand that a defense
for the pricing based on legitimate business reasons unrelated to predation
should be allowed so there should not be a presumption (as there is in the A-
T price-marginal cost test) that failing the first prong should suggest that
somehin od isoccrrig."143Interestingly, although previous formulations
of the Exclusionary Standard included a "legitimate business justification"
defense,'"4 this element is absent in the Cascade test and it remains to be seen
if such a defense will be available to future defendants.
conclusions respecting how Section 2 is and should be enforced cannot be said to represent
the consensus, or even the prevailing . .. view. . . ." Id. Specifically, the Commissioners
rejected the DOJ's safe harbor proposal and professed that the "Commission stands ready to
fill any Sherman Act enforcement void that might be created if the [DOJI actually
implements [the Report]." Id. at 7, 11. The report was finally withdrawn by the DOJ on
May 11, 2009. See DOJ, Justice Department Withdraws, supra note 17 (detailing the
withdrawal); see also Greenlee et al., supra note 10, at 1149 (warning that the Ortho test
"should be used with care"). But see Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, supra note 13, at 343
(arguing in favor of "a per se rule against exclusionary bundling" when "the foreclosure is
significant and the monopolist could have reasonably understood the effect of its pricing").
143. AN~TITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 7, at 399.
144. See AREEDA & HOVENKAmp, supra note 37, at 323 ("A requirement that the
bundling practice be sufficiently severe so as to exclude an equally efficient single-product
rival, and without an adequate business justification, seems to strike about the right balance
between permitting aggressive pricing while prohibiting conduct that can only be
characterized as anticompetitive."); see also POSNER, supra note 6, at 194-95 (proposing that
"the plaintiff must prove that the challenged practice is likely ... to exclude fr~om the market
an equally or more efficient competitor", rebuttable by a defendant "proving that although it
is a monopolist and the challenged practice exclusionary, the practice is, on balance,
efficient"). But see Lambert, supra note 79, at 1736-37 (criticizing the test and showing that
it may condemn above-cost exclusionary yet desirable bundles). Although the Cascade
court relied on Areeda and Hovenkamnp in deciding to reject the Ortho test, it did not adopt
the "legitimate business justification" element that Areeda and Hovenkamp offered, and it is
questionable whether this element (whether as part of the plaintiff's prima facie case or the
defendant's defense) exists under Cascade. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515
F.3d 883, 906-07 (9th Cir. 2008). The omission to discuss relevant business justifications
may indicate the court's disapproval, but it may also be the result of the court's focus on the
plaintiff's burden. After oral arguments, the Cascade court issued an order inviting amici
curiae to submit briefs addressing the issue of whether a plaint iff who seeks to establish
predatory bundling "must prove that the defendant's prices were below an appropriate
measure of the defendant's costs." Id. at 899 n.9. Because the focus was on the plaintiff's
burden, if considered by the court (the issue was not raised by the amici curiae in the context
of § 2) to be a defense-it may explain why the business justification element was absent.
In any case, the question remains open. See Brief of Arnici Curiae Law Professors, supra
note 37, at 5, 7 n.8 (arguing that plaintiffs "challenging a bundled discount scheme should be
required to show at a minimum, that the competitive products in the bundle were priced
below cost" and noting that "Amici do not discuss those further showings" plaintiffs may
need to show if the bundle fails the Cascade test).
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